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Article 
Anticompetitive Patent Injunctions 
Erik Hovenkamp* & Thomas F. Cotter† 
  INTRODUCTION   
Patent rights reflect a deliberate tradeoff of “static” (short-
term) for “dynamic” (long-term) efficiency.1 Governments grant 
patents knowing full well that in doing so they may be confer-
ring some degree of monopoly power2 because, while this is 
economically detrimental in the short-run,3 it may nevertheless 
promote overall efficiency by spurring innovation sufficient to 
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tion International; and students in Professor Claire Hill’s Law and Economics 
Seminar for their comments and criticism. Any errors that remain are ours. 
Copyright © 2016 by Erik Hovenkamp & Thomas F. Cotter. 
 1. See, e.g., Michael Abramowicz & John F. Duffy, The Inducement 
Standard of Patentability, 120 YALE L.J. 1590, 1597 (2011) (“Economic analy-
sis of patent law frequently begins with the assertion that patents present a 
social tradeoff between providing incentives for innovation at the expense of 
accepting the deadweight loss associated with monopoly-like exclusive 
rights.”); Michael J. Burstein, Exchanging Information Without Intellectual 
Property, 91 TEX. L. REV. 227, 276 (2012) (“The classic economic analysis of 
intellectual property posits a tradeoff between static costs and dynamic bene-
fits.”); Gideon Parchomovsky & Peter Siegelman, Towards an Integrated Theo-
ry of Intellectual Property, 88 VA. L. REV. 1455, 1500 (2002) (“Patent policy 
embodies a tradeoff between dynamic and static efficiency.”).  
 2. See Thomas F. Cotter, The Procompetitive Interest in Intellectual 
Property Law, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 483, 486–87 (2006). Courts no longer 
presume that patents confer market power because, in fact, most patents are 
never used or licensed and even those that are often compete with a range of 
potential substitutes. Some patents do confer market power, however, and it is 
the potential (even if, ex ante, unlikely) prospect of this outcome that is pre-
sumed to motivate firms to invest in R&D. See id. at 486.  
 3. See, e.g., ROGER D. BLAIR & THOMAS F. COTTER, INTELLECTUAL PROP-
ERTY: ECONOMIC AND LEGAL DIMENSIONS OF RIGHTS AND REMEDIES 18 (2005). 
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offset the social costs of temporarily suppressed competition.4 
Of course, a promise of exclusive rights to an invention is vacu-
ous without a mechanism for enforcement, and thus it is ulti-
mately patent remedies that lay the groundwork for the incen-
tive problem at the heart of patent policy. It is therefore curious 
that, in deciding whether to grant an injunction for the in-
fringement of a patent (as opposed to awarding an ongoing roy-
alty instead) courts focus on the immediate hardships an in-
junction might impose on the litigants and the public, but not 
on a consideration that is far more relevant to the patent sys-
tem’s goal of promoting dynamic welfare: namely, the extent to 
which the ability to exclude competitors was a necessary in-
ducement for the plaintiff’s decision to bring its products to 
market.5 In this Article, we present a simple economic model 
showing that, under certain identifiable conditions, courts 
should deny injunctions because the exclusion of infringing 
competitors will reduce static consumer welfare without any 
corresponding dynamic efficiency gain.  
Our analysis leads to two key insights that are relevant to 
a broad range of cases at the core of contemporary patent policy 
debates. The first is that it is sometimes possible to conclude 
that injunctive relief for patent infringement will result in an 
unambiguous social welfare loss, based upon inferences that 
reasonably can be drawn from the fact that a firm entered a 
product market unprotected by any expectation of being able to 
enjoin competitors using the technology in question.6 The se-
cond is to develop a theory of a heretofore unexplored7 business 
 
 4. See CHRISTINA BOHANNAN & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, CREATION WITH-
OUT RESTRAINT: PROMOTING LIBERTY AND RIVALRY IN INNOVATION xi, 8–11, 
14, 241–42 (2012) (noting that the long-term welfare gains from innovation are 
likely substantially higher than the short-term welfare gains derived from the 
elimination of anticompetitive market conditions); Josh Lerner, The Patent 
System in a Time of Turmoil, 2 WIPO J. 28, 32 (2010) (noting that, while there 
are some dissenters, most economists “would agree that some intellectual 
property protection is better than no intellectual property protection at all,” 
while recognizing that “this does not mean that very strong protection is bet-
ter than a more moderate level of protection”).  
 5. See infra notes 29–33 and accompanying text. 
 6. In this regard, our analysis parallels that of Abramowicz and Duffy, 
who argue that in deciding whether an invention was patentably nonobvious 
the Patent Office and the courts should consider whether, absent the patent 
incentive, the invention “would not have been disclosed or devised for a sub-
stantial period of time.” See Abramowicz & Duffy, supra note 1, at 1599. 
Roughly speaking, our analysis asks whether, absent the ability to enjoin in-
fringers, the patent owner would have entered the market anyway.  
 7. While unexplored in patent law, the underlying strategy has been ad-
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model that is becoming increasingly common and that we refer 
to as the “diagonally integrated” nonpracticing entity (NPE),8 
which is a producer that acquires patents it does not practice, 
but which competes with some downstream firms that use (or 
could potentially use) those patented technologies. Such firms 
seek neither to use nor to license on reasonable terms the ac-
quired patents, a strategy that largely serves to exclude these 
technologies from the marketplace. As a consequence, diagonal-
ly integrated NPEs impose much greater social welfare costs 
than do more conventional types of NPEs. These insights pro-
vide valuable implications concerning a number of widely scru-
tinized contemporary patent issues, including the consequences 
of making commitments to license standard-essential patents 
(SEPs) on fair, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory (FRAND) 
terms; patent privateering; and preemptive patenting. 
To illustrate, consider the facts of a recent Federal Circuit 
decision, Trebro Manufacturing, Inc. v. FireFly Equipment, 
L.L.C.9 The patents in suit relate to a type of agricultural vehi-
 
dressed in antitrust. This disparity is not surprising given the courts’ incon-
sistent approaches to competition policy within and outside the patent context, 
which effectively leaves them with one silo for patent law and a second silo for 
antitrust. See, e.g., HERBERT HOVENKAMP, THE ANTITRUST ENTERPRISE 272 
(2008) (“[S]trategic acquisition and nonuse of patents are unlawful monopoli-
zation if they restrain competition unreasonably.”); see also Kobe, Inc. v. 
Dempsey Pump Co., 198 F.2d 416, 424 (10th Cir. 1952) (explaining that the 
dominant firm’s acquisition and nonuse of an important patent could violate 
Section 2 of the Sherman Act). 
 8. See infra note 24 and accompanying text. 
 9. 748 F.3d 1159 (Fed. Cir. 2014). A much older case that involved large-
ly the same fact pattern as Trebro is Continental Paper Bag Co. v. Eastern Pa-
per Bag Co., 210 U.S. 405 (1908). As in Trebro, a firm with a large market 
share purchased a patent from a third party, did not use or license it, and 
sought injunctive relief against another firm that allegedly infringed the pa-
tent. See id. at 406. The Supreme Court held that the patent owner was under 
no duty to use the patent and that, because the defendant’s device infringed 
under patent law’s doctrine of equivalents, injunctive relief was appropriate. 
See id. at 422–30; see also BOHANNAN & HOVENKAMP, supra note 4, at 295–98 
(discussing, among other things, the Paper Bag plaintiff’s acquisition of the 
patent from the inventor). Bohannan and Hovenkamp argue more broadly 
that courts generally should not grant injunctive relief to nonusing patent 
owners, but in addition they argue that “the Paper Bag rule is catastrophically 
negative” when the infringement is inadvertent, “when the shelf life of the pa-
tented invention is shorter than the term of the patent,” and “when the ac-
quirer is a dominant firm, or monopolist, and the acquisition serves to main-
tain a monopoly in a market that would otherwise have been competitive.” 
BOHANNAN & HOVENKAMP, supra note 4, at 298. The authors also recommend 
that antitrust enforcers limit market-dominant firms to acquiring only nonex-
clusive patent licenses. See id. at 293; see also HERBERT HOVENKAMP ET AL., 
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cle known as a “sod harvester,” and the market for these devic-
es consists of only three firms: patent owner Trebro, Brouwer 
Turf Inc., and a new entrant, FireFly.10 In 2013, a company af-
filiated with Brouwer sold Trebro the two patents in suit, in ex-
change for which Trebro canceled a debt owed by Brouwer and 
granted Brouwer a royalty-free, nonexclusive license to the two 
patents; Trebro itself, however, does not use the patented tech-
nology in any of the harvesters it sells.11 Shortly after acquiring 
the patents Trebro filed suit against FireFly, alleging that 
FireFly’s “ProSlab 150” harvesters, which compete against Tre-
bro’s unpatented “SC2010” model, infringe the patents.12  
Before the matter proceeded to trial, Trebro moved for a 
preliminary injunction, which the district court denied on the 
ground that Trebro was unlikely to succeed on the merits and 
had not succeeded in proving irreparable harm.13 With respect 
to this latter issue, the court concluded that an award of dam-
ages in the form of lost profits or a reasonable royalty would 
fully compensate Trebro if it were to prevail at trial.14 On inter-
locutory appeal, the Federal Circuit vacated the district court’s 
order denying the injunction, first because in the appellate 
court’s view Trebro’s patent likely was valid and infringed,15 
and second because “[t]he district court clearly erred in finding 
as speculative the harm Trebro is likely to suffer if its direct 
 
IP AND ANTITRUST § 14.3c (2d ed. 2013) (suggesting nonexclusive patent li-
censes as a solution to “competitive objections to intellectual property acquisi-
tions by dominant firms”). In Trebro, this would have meant that Brouwer 
Turf would have retained ownership of, and the right to sue for the infringe-
ment of, the patent. See BLAIR & COTTER, supra note 3, at 168 (licensors have 
standing to sue, while nonexclusive licensees do not). We have no quarrel with 
this reasoning, but our analysis provides an additional set of reasons for deny-
ing injunctions in cases like Paper Bag or Trebro, and as discussed in Part III 
also casts light on other recurring situations that do not necessarily involve 
acquisition of a patent from a third party or the patent owner’s market domi-
nance. Finally, we would note that, as a doctrinal matter, although the Su-
preme Court’s decision in eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 
(2006), does not explicitly overrule Paper Bag, it greatly restricts the reach of 
that decision. See infra note 31 and accompanying text (discussing eBay).  
 10. See Trebro, 748 F.3d at 1164, 1170. 
 11. See id. at 1162, 1164, 1171. 
 12. See id. 
 13. See id. at 1164–65. Under the applicable law, the moving party “must 
establish that he is likely to succeed on the merits, that he is likely to suffer 
irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the balance of equi-
ties tips in his favor, and that an injunction is in the public interest.” Id. at 
1165 (quoting Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008)). 
 14. See id. 
 15. Id. at 1166–70. 
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competitor is able to sell an infringing product in the small, 
niche sod harvester market.”16 In the court’s view, FireFly’s al-
legedly infringing sales not only cost Trebro corresponding 
sales of its unpatented SC2010 harvesters, but (due to the du-
rability of the products and the size of the market) also result 
in a loss of customers and substantial market share, which 
Trebro is unlikely to recover.17 The fact that Trebro’s products 
themselves do not use Trebro’s ‘638 Patent does not detract 
from this harm.18 The court then remanded for consideration of 
the remaining preliminary injunction factors (balance of harms 
and public interest), noting however that the “patent will have 
significantly less value if Trebro cannot use it to exclude an in-
fringing product” and suggesting that because the market is 
small an injunction “may not have a broad-reaching effect.”19  
As the court noted, Trebro is hardly the first case in which 
the Federal Circuit has stated that a patent owner whose own 
products do not embody its patented invention may obtain an 
injunction against a competitor whose products allegedly do 
embody that invention.20 By contrast, in cases in which the pa-
tent owner makes no products—that is, in which the owner is a 
nonpracticing entity (NPE)21—U.S. courts since the Supreme 
Court’s decision in eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C.22 are like-
ly to deny preliminary and permanent injunctive relief, on the 
ground (among others) that infringement does not threaten the 
NPE with “irreparable” harm.23 This follows from the fact that, 
 
 16. Id. at 1170. 
 17. Id. at 1170–71. 
 18. Id. at 1171. 
 19. Id. at 1171–72. 
 20. See id. at 1171 (citing Presidio Components, Inc. v. Am. Tech. Ceram-
ics Corp., 702 F.3d 1351, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2012); Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm 
Inc., 543 F.3d 683, 702–03 (Fed. Cir. 2008)). 
 21. The terms “patent assertion entity” (PAE), “patent monetization enti-
ty” (PME), and “patent troll” generally refer to NPEs that obtain patents from 
their original owners for the purpose of enforcing them against alleged in-
fringers. For discussion of the many different types of NPEs in the contempo-
rary marketplace, see, for example, Malte Köllner & Paul Weber, Trolls and 
Their Consequences—An Evolving IP Ecosystem, 3 MITTEILUNGEN DER 
DEUTSCHEN PATENTANWÄLTE 106 (2014); Raymond Millien, Landscape 2013: 
Who Are the Players in the IP Marketplace?, IPWATCHDOG (Jan. 23, 2013), 
http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2013/01/23/ip-landscape/id=33356.  
 22. 547 U.S. 388 (2006). 
 23. See, e.g., Colleen V. Chien & Mark A. Lemley, Patent Holdup, the ITC, 
and the Public Interest, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 8–11 (2013) (reporting that, 
from July 2006 to August 2011, prevailing PAEs obtained permanent injunc-
tions in 26% of cases (5 of 19), compared with a 75% rate for all patentees, and 
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unlike Trebro and other practicing entities, NPEs generally 
have no interest in excluding competitors, since NPEs produce 
and sell no products themselves and typically are willing to li-
cense their patents for the right price. 
Nevertheless, we argue that Trebro is best viewed as a type 
of NPE—more specifically, a “diagonally integrated” NPE that 
uses its idle patents to impair or exclude firms from competing 
against the products the diagonally integrated firm does pro-
duce24—and that entry of an injunction on the specific facts of 
Trebro undermines the public interest in competition, without 
any offsetting social benefit. More precisely, in Part I below we 
present a simple economic model showing that, where a firm (1) 
enters a product market without any protection against com-
peting technologies; (2) makes and sells goods embodying un-
protected technology a; and (3) acquires from a third party but 
does not use a patent covering a competing technology b, grant-
ing that firm an injunction against an infringer’s unauthorized 
use of technology b to market competing products creates an 
unambiguous static welfare loss that cannot be justified by any 
potential gains to dynamic efficiency.25  
Significantly, two main points that emerge from our model 
have implications that extend far beyond the narrow facts of 
Trebro. The first is that, when it is possible to infer that a firm 
was willing to enter a market unprotected by a right to enjoin 
competitors, it is often appropriate to deny the firm injunctive 
relief against patent infringement. Trebro is an example of 
such a case, but as we explain in Part II the fact that a firm 
was willing to make an unprotected market entry also makes it 
appropriate to deny injunctive relief in two other classes of cas-
 
that the rate is only 7% for PAEs in cases in which the injunction was contest-
ed). NPEs that are not PAEs, however, including individuals and universities, 
“have enjoyed higher-than-average injunction-grant rates” than other NPEs. 
Id. at 10. The U.S. International Trade Commission, however, provides a par-
allel forum for some patent infringement disputes, and may exclude infringing 
imports; it is not bound by the eBay rule. See Spansion, Inc. v. Int’l Trade 
Comm’n, 629 F.3d 1331, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2010).  
 24. See Richard S. Higgins, Diagonal Merger, 12 REV. INDUS. ORG. 609, 
610 (1997) (coining the term “diagonal merger”). 
 25. Note that we are not talking about a firm that makes an unprotected 
entry into the market for product a while it is working on, or seeking patent 
protection for, a technology that is embodied in product a. Market pressures 
often compel firms to begin commercializing their technology before they have 
succeeded in obtaining legal protection for that technology, and nothing in our 
analysis demonstrates that denying these firms injunctions would increase 
social welfare. 
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es that feature in contemporary patent policy debates, namely 
actions filed by patent “privateers”26 and cases involving the al-
leged infringement of FRAND-encumbered SEPs.27 Our analy-
sis also sheds some light, albeit less conclusively, on the peren-
nial question of whether courts should grant injunctive relief 
when the patentee allegedly has engaged in “preemptive” pa-
tenting—that is, patenting for the purpose of excluding compet-
itors from using a technology the patent owner itself does not 
intend to use.28 
Part III develops the second key point to emerge from the 
model, namely, that diagonally integrated NPEs can give rise 
to serious but, up until now largely unappreciated, social wel-
fare costs. Circumstances formally identical to those found in 
Trebro are in fact becoming increasingly common, with practic-
ing entities acquiring existing patents not for purposes of their 
own use, but rather for the purpose of exclusion or licensing. 
Our model shows that ownership by a diagonally integrated 
NPE generally results in higher licensing fees and more ag-
gressive litigation in pursuit of injunctive relief than would be 
 
 26. “Privateering” is the term used when a practicing entity assigns pa-
tents to a nonpracticing third party who then seeks to enforce the patents. The 
third-party “privateer” then distributes a portion of the resulting proceeds 
back to the assignor, in accordance with the terms of the assignment. See infra 
Part II.A.  
As noted above, since the Supreme Court’s 2006 eBay decision, courts 
generally have been reluctant to grant injunctive relief to PAEs—and as we 
will see, privateers for the most part are a species of PAE. Nevertheless, our 
analysis provides some additional reasons why courts should resist granting 
privateers injunctive relief, which may prove useful in specific cases in this 
country as well as in jurisdictions outside the United States where the eBay 
rule has yet to take hold.  
 27. Standards setting organizations (SSOs) such as the European Tele-
communications Standards Institute (ETSI) typically require members to dis-
close any patents that might read on a standard under consideration, to “de-
clare” any patents that are essential to the practice of the chosen standard, 
and to commit to license those patents on “reasonable and nondiscriminatory” 
(RAND) or “fair, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory” (FRAND) terms. See, e.g., 
RUDI BEKKERS & ANDREW UPDEGROVE, U.S. NAT’L ACADS. OF SCI., A STUDY 
OF IPR POLICIES AND PRACTICES OF A REPRESENTATIVE GROUP OF STANDARDS 
SETTING ORGANIZATIONS WORLDWIDE 48–99 (2012), http://sites 
.nationalacademies.org/cs/groups/pgasite/documents/webpage/pga_072197.pdf. 
In contemporary practice, RAND and FRAND are used interchangeably, 
though as of 2014 FRAND seems to be on its way toward becoming the more 
common usage. For discussion, see infra Part II.B. 
 28. See BLAIR & COTTER, supra note 3, at 248–50; Roger D. Blair & 
Thomas F. Cotter, Rethinking Patent Damages, 10 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 1, 
77–78 (2001). 
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the case if the patents were owned by conventional “unin-
tegrated” NPEs, which (again) typically are interested in licens-
ing, not exclusion. Counterintuitively, conventional NPEs may 
pose less of a threat to short- and long-term consumer welfare 
than do their diagonally integrated counterparts. They also 
create welfare harms that would not arise if they were practic-
ing entities with respect to the disputed patent. Diagonally in-
tegrated NPEs are thus distinct from both practicing entities 
and traditional, unintegrated NPEs. 
I.  UNPROTECTED MARKET ENTRY   
The principal ambition of the patent system is not to re-
ward inventors, nor is it to extract compensation from those 
who reap the benefits of others’ ideas. Rather, its aim is to in-
duce innovative activity that would not arise if new inventions 
were unprotected from the forces of open competition. The pro-
tections afforded by patents are merely the inducements we use 
to achieve this goal.29 In this way, the protections provided by a 
particular patent are socially valuable only to the extent that 
they were necessary to induce the patentee’s innovative ef-
 
 29. To be sure, some scholars have proposed noneconomic theories of pa-
tent rights, premised for example on the inventor’s investment of labor in de-
veloping a new invention, or on the argument that property rights, including 
intellectual property rights, assist us in realizing greater personal autonomy. 
See, e.g., ROBERT P. MERGES, JUSTIFYING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (2011). In 
another work, however, one of us has expressed skepticism over the wisdom of 
taking such noneconomic rationales into account in formulating patent policy. 
See Thomas F. Cotter, Legal Pragmatism and Intellectual Property Law, in 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE COMMON LAW 211, 221–24 (Shyamkrishna 
Balganesh ed., 2013). There also are other proposed economic justifications, 
including Edmund Kitch’s prospect theory. See Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature 
and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. & ECON. 265, 267–71 (1977) (argu-
ing that patents enable inventors to efficiently coordinate the development of 
an inventive “prospect”). Scholars are divided on the merits of the prospect 
theory. See THOMAS F. COTTER, COMPARATIVE PATENT REMEDIES: A LEGAL 
AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 27 (2013) (noting some of the relevant literature). 
But even if one believes that patents sometimes may serve Kitch’s prospect 
function, and that injunctive relief is vital to their ability to do so, see Kitch, 
supra, at 286–87, in the cases we discuss herein the social benefits of prospect-
ing would have to be very substantial indeed in order to outweigh the social 
welfare losses resulting from the granting of injunctions; and this seems un-
likely if, as in our examples, the patent owner clearly is not using the patent to 
coordinate follow-up improvements but rather merely to exclude competition 
or to extract royalties. In any event, the rationale described in the text 
above—that patents encourage the creation and disclosure of new inven-
tions—remains the dominant justification for the patent system, and the one 
to which we will devote our attention.  
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forts.30 Any protections provided in excess of this amount are 
unnecessary, and their exercise engenders a social loss. Howev-
er, this point is often lost in the course of evaluating injunctive 
relief as a remedy for infringement. The courts instead focus 
myopically on ascertaining and comparing the hardships of the 
litigants and the public at large,31 leading them to ignore the 
question most relevant to the patent system’s ambitions: Did 
the plaintiff’s decision to develop its patented technology hinge 
on its ability to exclude infringers32 like the defendant?33 This 
 
 30. See Abramowicz & Duffy, supra note 1, at 1593–603 (arguing that an 
inducement framework should guide the analysis of whether an invention was 
nonobvious). 
 31. See eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006) (“[A] 
plaintiff seeking a permanent injunction . . . must demonstrate: (1) that it has 
suffered an irreparable injury; (2) that remedies available at law, such as 
monetary damages, are inadequate to compensate for that injury; (3) that, 
considering the balance of hardships between the plaintiff and defendant, a 
remedy in equity is warranted; and (4) that the public interest would not be 
disserved by a permanent injunction.”). The eBay factors do not explicitly re-
quire courts to consider the plaintiff’s innovation incentive, though courts 
sometimes do refer to the public interest in “the enforcement of patent rights 
to promote the ‘encouragement of investment-based risk.’” Apple, Inc. v. Sam-
sung Elecs. Co., 909 F. Supp. 2d 1147, 1162 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (quoting Sanofi-
Synthelabo v. Apotex, Inc., 470 F.3d 1368, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 2006)), aff’d in part, 
vacated in part on other grounds, 735 F.3d 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2013). The Federal 
Circuit has cautioned, however, this interest “must also be weighed with other 
aspects of the public interest.” Apple, Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 735 F.3d 
1352, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2013). In the text above, we propose that, in appropriate 
circumstances, courts should take into account, as part of the public interest 
analysis, whether an injunction is necessary to preserve innovation incentives. 
 32. Throughout this Article we restrict attention to unintentional in-
fringements—independently invented technologies that happen to read on the 
patent in question. Permitting injunctions of willful infringements will more 
often be necessary, as this serves to mitigate the free-riding problem that 
would arise if intentional copying were not adequately deterred. That is, if in-
tentional copiers are simply made to pay damages, they may choose to do so 
rather than developing their own ideas. Thus, injunctions of intentional in-
fringers may be necessary to preserve the incentive to innovate among poten-
tial defendants. Concededly, though, there may be some difficulties in deter-
mining what “unintentional infringement” means or should mean in some 
contexts, for example where the defendant could have uncovered the patent by 
means of a reasonable pre-use search. See COTTER, supra note 29, at 62 n.47; 
Thomas F. Cotter, The Comparative Law and Eonomics of Standard-Essential 
Patents and FRAND Royalties, 22 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 311, 344 n.148 
(2014). Be that as it may, some evidence suggests that intentional copying is 
much less common than unintentional infringement. See Christopher A. Co-
tropia & Mark A. Lemley, Copying in Patent Law, 87 N.C. L. REV. 1421, 1462–
64 (2008). 
 33. Of course, the plaintiff is not always the inventor or the inventor’s 
employer. If instead the plaintiff is a non-practicing entity (NPE) who ac-
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Article demonstrates that there are some circumstances in 
which we can deduce that the answer is no. In these situations 
there is no policy justification for awarding an injunction, no 
matter the magnitude of the plaintiff’s injury. Instead, as dis-
cussed below, the court should apply a liability rule34 and 
award an ongoing royalty in place of injunctive relief. 
The importance of identifying when injunctive relief is un-
warranted stems from its particularly harmful impact on static 
(short-run) welfare, that is, the level of consumer or social wel-
fare that is associated with the present state of the market, 
given the products currently available. To the extent that, in 
the short run, there are no readily available noninfringing al-
ternatives that the defendant can substitute for the patented 
invention, this impact is threefold. First, an injunction damp-
ens competition by effectively excluding the defendant from the 
relevant product market, thus enabling any remaining firms 
 
quired the patent, then this question centers on whether the original inven-
tor’s development decision idea hinged on his ability to sell to an NPE, and to 
do so at the higher price the patent would command when this NPE retains 
the right to enjoin infringers and thus extract some portion of the switching 
cost the defendant otherwise would incur ex post if it were to design around 
the patented technology. In a companion paper, one of us argues that, in prin-
ciple, enabling the patent owner to extract the defendant’s avoided switching 
costs results in a reward that is presumptively disproportionate to the inven-
tion’s social value. See Norman V. Siebrasse & Thomas F. Cotter, A New 
Framework for Determining Reasonable Royalties in Patent Litigation, 68 FLA. 
L. REV. (forthcoming 2016) (manuscript at 10–11), http://ssrn.com/ 
abstract=2528616. Nevertheless, even if the patentee’s ultimate interest is (as 
it is for many NPEs) to license the invention to, rather than to exclude, the 
defendant, and the incentive to invent would not be impaired by preventing 
the patentee from extracting switching costs, injunctive relief may be optimal 
if a court’s calculation of an ongoing royalty would generate adjudication and 
error costs that exceed the social cost of enabling the patent owner to extract 
the switching costs. See COTTER, supra note 29, at 53–55 (arguing that, even 
when the patent owner’s ultimate interest resides in licensing its invention, 
protecting intellectual property rights by means of a property rule may econ-
omize on adjudication and error costs by capitalizing on the parties’ presump-
tive advantage, in comparison with a court, in estimating patent value).  
Alternatively, in some cases the product the plaintiff markets and which 
the injunction shields from competition is not covered by the patent in suit. 
This is what happened in Trebro, where the court held that an injunction 
might be proper to protect the plaintiff’s competing but uninfringed product. 
See Trebro Mfg., Inc. v. FireFly Equip., L.L.C., 748 F.3d 1159, 1171 (Fed. Cir. 
2014). In such situations, the relevant question is whether the inventor of the 
patented technology would have developed that technology absent the ability 
of the plaintiff to shield its unpatented product from competition by excluding 
users of the patented technology.  
 34. See infra note 41. 
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(including the plaintiff) to increase price and reduce output. (In 
a case like Trebro, where there are only three firms in the en-
tire market and the defendant is a new entrant,35 this effect 
could be quite significant.) Second, by eliminating a distinct 
product variety from the market, the injunction forces many 
consumers to settle for their second favorite product. Third, the 
defendant may be effectively barred from using not only the in-
fringing technology, but also any of its own intellectual proper-
ty that is incorporated into the infringing product, unless such 
complementary intellectual property can be deployed for other 
purposes. By contrast, an injunction in a dispute between 
neighboring landowners will typically not inhibit the defend-
ant’s ability to use and enjoy the undisputed portions of his 
own property, nor is the injunction likely to have a substantial 
impact on nonparties. 
Despite their harmful effects on static welfare, injunctions 
nevertheless may be optimal in those cases where they serve to 
substantially promote dynamic (long-run) welfare, which takes 
into account not only the present state of the market, but also 
the innovative activities that lead to the introduction of new 
and improved products over time. This boils down to the fact 
that some potential inventors would not develop their new ide-
as unless they were assured that they could enjoin infringers. 
This is most likely to occur in situations where a technology is 
expensive to develop, but costs comparatively little to reproduce 
thereafter.36 Under these circumstances injunctive relief is effi-
 
 35. See Trebro, 748 F.3d at 1164, 1170. 
 36. In such a case, the expected advantage of being the first in the market 
with a new invention may not be adequate to motivate the development of the 
invention in the first place. Conceivably, other mechanisms such as trade se-
cret may suffice in some cases, though these often entail greater risk to the 
inventor and/or greater disadvantages to the public (less disclosure, for exam-
ple). See COTTER, supra note 29, at 26–27. Of course, in some instances the 
inventor’s ultimate interest lies not in excluding competition, as posited in the 
text above, but rather in licensing it to a more efficient manufacturer or dis-
tributor. In these cases, the principal social benefit of injunctive relief, to be 
balanced against the corresponding social costs, may be to conserve on adjudi-
cation and error costs. See supra note 33. 
Note, however, that an inventor’s interest in enjoining infringers does not 
necessarily imply that the inventor is a practicing entity. Small or university-
based inventors, for example, may lack the ability (manufacturing capacity, 
know-how, etc.) to successfully bring a new product to market, in which case it 
is more efficient to license production to someone else. See COTTER, supra note 
29, at 45 (arguing more generally that licensing is efficient when the inven-
tor’s marginal cost of producing or marketing the invention is higher than a 
prospective licensee’s). In such cases, a right to enjoin infringers enables the 
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cient, because it is better to have a product market that is non-
competitive than to have no market at all. This is the critical 
tradeoff that motivates the patent system. 
If, however, the circumstances of a particular case indicate 
that the plaintiff would have entered the market even absent 
the possibility of enjoining infringers, then it is best not to 
award an injunction. This way we avoid the static problems of 
injunctive relief without compromising dynamic welfare. In 
fact, if an inventor did not view injunctive relief as an essential 
protection when he chose to develop his idea, then he should be 
denied an injunction even if he ultimately confronts unexpect-
edly injurious competition that, if anticipated, would have led 
him to reevaluate the essentiality of injunctive relief. Indeed, 
awarding injunctions to these unlucky plaintiffs would do noth-
ing for dynamic welfare: it would not bring any more inventions 
to market than would have arrived otherwise because, by hy-
pothesis, these inventors would have developed their products 
either way.37 In truth, development of an untested product is 
always a gamble; the patent system seeks to persuade an in-
ventor to place his bet, not to ensure that he wins. 
Importantly, this incentive-based approach to injunctive 
relief would not deter any future inventors from developing 
their ideas. Indeed, it signals to a prospective innovator that he 
will be denied an injunction only if his idea is so promising that 
its development will be profitable even in lieu of the right to ex-
 
inventor to determine which person or persons to license and which to exclude. 
Often the inventor will be better off licensing the patent to one or more select-
ed users on an exclusive basis, rather than negotiating nonexclusive licenses 
with all prospective users. See BLAIR & COTTER, supra note 3, at 203–06. 
Thus, the fact that the inventor has chosen to license one or more persons to 
practice the invention is not sufficient, by itself, to compel the inference that 
the prospect of obtaining injunctive relief against some unauthorized users 
was immaterial to the decision to invent. Allowing the inventor to enjoin in-
fringers who interfere with the inventor’s interest in exclusive licensing there-
fore may preserve the patent incentive and thus promote long-run efficiency.  
Finally, even in a case in which the inventor ultimately is willing to li-
cense an alleged infringer, the ability to threaten injunctive relief may enable 
the inventor to extract a higher royalty than otherwise would be the case. See 
infra notes 41–43 and accompanying text. As discussed in Part II, however, we 
are skeptical whether this consequence of a right to injunctive relief promotes 
dynamic efficiency.  
 37. The possibility that such actors might be risk averse does not under-
mine the optimality of this rule. This is because the rule is subjective: a specif-
ic plaintiff should be denied an injunction under this rule only if, given the 
way he viewed his own prospects, he would have developed his idea even with-
out retaining the right to enjoin infringers. 
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clude infringers. In this way, the rule impacts only those inven-
tors hoping to get what they want, and not simply what they 
need. As a result, the only real concern with such a rule is that 
it will often be impossible to implement. That is, in most patent 
disputes the court will be unable to ascertain the plaintiff’s in-
centives at the time of invention. However, we show that there 
are a number of situations in which we can infer an inventor’s 
non-reliance on injunctive relief from his actions and the cir-
cumstances under which his invention entered the market. 
It is also worth noting that this approach to evaluating in-
junctive relief does not rely on the plaintiff’s ability to foresee 
the infringement in question at the time of invention. That is, 
we do not assume the plaintiff affirmatively considered the pos-
sibility of confronting the specific infringement at issue. In real-
ity an innovator will typically be unable to foresee all possible 
infringements that might arise; the same is true of her ability 
to foresee future noninfringing but competing technologies. Ra-
ther we ask whether, given whatever preconceptions the inven-
tor had about the competing products she might face, the deci-
sion to develop the invention did not hinge on the ability to 
enjoin any such products that happen to read on her patent.38 
This is likely to be true whenever competitors can readily in-
vent around the patent without materially compromising prod-
uct quality, as in this case the inventor enters the market 
knowing she will likely face noninfringing competition that is 
just as harmful as true infringement. 
To formalize our theory, we analyze a very simple economic 
model illustrating the relevant tradeoffs that determine the 
suitability of injunctive relief. The model surrounds the prob-
lem the courts face in deciding whether to employ a liability 
rule or a property rule in a given patent dispute. A liability rule 
does not enable a property holder to prevent others from violat-
ing her property rights; it merely entitles her to receive com-
pensation for any such violations.39 Under this rule, a firm may 
infringe a rival’s patent without fear of being enjoined, but the 
 
 38. Recall that this Article restricts attention to unintentional infringe-
ments, so this boils down to the question of whether the inventor was willing 
to compete with independently invented infringements, which are less likely to 
be perfect copies of the invention. See supra note 32 (noting this paper’s focus 
on unintentional infringements). 
 39. See Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability 
Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 
1092 (1972). 
  
884 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [100:871 
 
courts will force it to pay damages to the patent holder. Under 
a property rule, the patent holder is entitled to absolute control 
over its patented technology, and any firm that practices its pa-
tent without permission may be enjoined as a matter of 
course.40 Importantly, an inventor will always prefer to have a 
property rule, because this maximizes the value of her property 
right. Even if she does not intend, ultimately, to use an injunc-
tion to exclude the defendant’s product from the market, she 
can threaten to enforce the injunction in order to secure a larg-
er licensing fee than a court might be inclined to award, under 
a liability rule regime, as an ongoing, postjudgment royalty.41 
Indeed, she can leverage the order to extract the largest 
amount that the defendant would willingly pay in order to con-
tinue operating.42 We will refer to a royalty negotiated in the 
shadow of a threatened injunction as a “supracompensatory” 
 
 40. Id. 
 41. This assumes that the damages awarded under a liability rule, for 
both past and future infringement, are not so high as to, in effect, replicate an 
award of injunctive relief. As for past infringement, when courts award dam-
ages in the form of reasonable royalties the standard framework calls for them 
to estimate the royalty the parties would have agreed to ex ante, before the 
infringement began. See Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d 1301, 
1325 (Fed. Cir. 2009). In a case in which the patentee’s interest would be 
served by excluding rather than licensing the infringer, however, there is no 
amount the parties really would have agreed to ex ante. The patentee would 
have demanded more than the infringer would have been willing to pay, and 
typically would seek an award of lost profits instead. See BLAIR & COTTER, su-
pra note 3, at 55–58, 231, 251–52. As for future infringement, the Federal Cir-
cuit has instructed district courts post-eBay to “take into account the change 
in the parties’ bargaining positions, and the resulting change in economic cir-
cumstances, resulting from the determination of liability” in determining the 
amount of an ongoing, postjudgment royalty. Amado v. Microsoft Corp., 517 
F.3d 1353, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
If, as we argue above, there are cases in which an award of injunctive re-
lief unambiguously would reduce social welfare, courts in such cases should 
modify the manner in which they award damages for both past and future in-
fringement to ensure that the damages they award do not simply replicate the 
effect of a right to exclude. In practical terms, this would mean awarding rea-
sonable royalties (not lost profits) for past infringement and an ongoing royal-
ty for future infringement, with both measures calculated so that the effect of 
paying the award does not effectively result in the infringer’s exclusion from 
the market. We may address this issue in greater detail in future work.  
 42. This amount may reflect the defendant’s sunk costs and its ex post 
costs of switching to an alternative technology, neither of which has any obvi-
ous bearing on the value of the technology. See, e.g., Joseph Farrell et al., 
Standard Setting, Patents, and Hold-Up, 74 ANTITRUST L.J. 603, 619–21 
(2007); Jay Pil Choi, FRAND Royalties and Injunctions for Standard Essential 
Patents 9–10 (CESifo Working Paper No. 5012, Oct. 2014), http://ssrn 
.com/abstract=2512789. 
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royalty; by definition it exceeds the royalty the parties would 
have negotiated prior to the defendant’s having incurred costs 
in reliance on its use of the infringing technology.43 
Consider a firm-inventor with an idea for a new patentable 
technology, a. The firm must incur a fixed cost of C(a) in order 
to develop the technology and bring it to market. Developing 
this technology is not the only activity in which it conceivably 
invests its resources. For example, it might alternatively ne-
glect to develop any new ideas and simply focus on continuing 
to market the products it has already developed. Thus the firm 
will only develop the technology if it will yield a net profit that 
exceeds its “reservation value,” denoted R, which is simply the 
value of the most profitable thing it could do other than devel-
oping technology a. If the firm decides to apply for a patent and 
bring the product to market, the profit it earns will depend on 
whether its property right is protected by a property rule or a 
liability rule. The firm’s expected profit is equal to ΠL(a) under 
a liability rule and to ΠP(a) under a property rule, where ΠP(a) 
> ΠL(a). Thus a patentee always prefers a property rule.44 By 
contrast, courts should prefer a liability rule whenever that 
rule is sufficient to uphold the dynamic interests of the patent 
system, because monetary damages do not produce the static 
welfare injuries imposed by injunctive relief.45 Thus the court 
will want to impose a property rule only if a liability rule would 
have been insufficient to induce the firm to bring its product to 
market. This possibility is stated in condition (C1).  
 
(C1)   ΠP(a) – C(a) ≥ R > ΠL(a) – C(a) 
 
By contrast, the court prefers to limit the firm to a liability 
rule if this alone would have been sufficient to induce its devel-
 
 43. See Fiona M. Scott Morton & Carl Shapiro, Strategic Patent Acquisi-
tions, 79 ANTITRUST L.J. 463, 471 & n.18 (2014). 
 44. See supra notes 40–42 and accompanying text. 
 45. Note, however, that awarding an ongoing royalty in lieu of an injunc-
tion may generate otherwise avoidable adjudication and error costs. See supra 
note 33. But when a patentee enforces an injunction to exclude a competitor 
but would have entered the market even in the absence of a right to injunctive 
relief, it is reasonable to assume that the social costs of exclusion (higher pric-
es, lower output, and limited consumer choice) outweigh the social costs of 
crafting an appropriate ongoing royalty. In such a case, an ongoing royalty re-
duces deadweight loss and causes no harm to dynamic efficiency, so whatever 
costs are incurred to determine the royalty mostly fall only on the parties 
themselves.  
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opment. This is embodied in condition (C2).  
 
(C2)   ΠP(a) – C(a) > ΠL(a) – C(a) ≥ R 
 
There is an obvious problem here. Every plaintiff has an 
incentive to claim its situation is described by (C1), but the var-
iables that comprise the above conditions are almost certainly 
not measurable by the courts. Even if courts could reliably es-
timate the firm’s profits and costs, there is almost surely no 
means of assessing the plaintiff’s reservation value. Unless 
there is some alternative information that might shed light on 
the inventor’s ex ante prospects, the courts lack any way to de-
termine whether an injunction is necessary to promote the dy-
namic interests of the patent system. It is perhaps because this 
information is so often unobtainable that the courts have rele-
gated themselves to a standard under which the plaintiff’s in-
centives at the time of invention are typically not even consid-
ered. 
Fortunately, these uncertainties are not always a road-
block. There are a number of circumstances in which courts 
may reliably infer that injunctive relief is unnecessary to pro-
mote dynamic welfare. To address the first such possibility, we 
present two definitions. First, we say a firm engages in unpro-
tected market entry with respect to a technology b if it enters 
the relevant product market without any legal protection 
against competing products utilizing technology b, and without 
materially relying on the possibility of acquiring such protec-
tion in the future. This is precisely what Trebro did when it en-
tered the sod harvester market without any protection from the 
competing technology embodied in the ‘638 patent.46 Second, we 
say a firm is a diagonally integrated non-practicing entity 
(NPE) with respect to a technology b if it owns but does not 
practice the patent on b, but competes with products using 
technology b in a downstream product market47 (detailed anal-
 
 46. See Trebro Mfg., Inc. v. FireFly Equip., L.L.C., 748 F.3d 1159, 1162, 
1170–71 (Fed. Cir. 2014). 
 47. The term “diagonal integration” refers to a situation in which a pro-
ducer acquires control of an upstream input used by a rival firm, but which 
the producer does not utilize in its own product. Thus a diagonally integrated 
NPE is simply a firm who becomes diagonally integrated by acquiring a patent 
that is practiced (or could be practiced) by some rival producers, but not by the 
acquiring firm itself. Note that acquiring but not practicing a patent may be 
valuable even if rivals do not presently practice the patent, as this may serve 
as a barrier to entry. See HOVENKAMP ET AL., supra note 9, § 14.3 (discussing 
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ysis of diagonally integrated NPEs and their welfare effects is 
the subject of Part III). Trebro became a diagonally integrated 
NPE when it acquired the ‘638 patent despite not using that 
technology in its own sod harvester.48 
Our primary conclusion is that a diagonally integrated 
NPE should never be entitled to enjoin an infringer of the diag-
onally integrated NPE’s unpracticed patent, if the diagonally 
integrated NPE entered the market before acquiring that pa-
tent from an unrelated third party. This implies that Trebro 
should be denied an injunction, as it entered the sod harvester 
market long before it acquired its unpracticed ‘638 patent.49 
However, the Federal Circuit reached a different conclusion, 
determining that such an injunction might be warranted in or-
der to protect Trebro’s interest in its own competing (but unin-
fringed) product.50 We show that this view is mistaken. Rather, 
injunctions in such circumstances are never warranted, be-
cause the plaintiff’s unprotected market entry indicates that 
she was undeterred by the possibility of competing with then-
noninfringing competitors like the defendant. Thus, an inabil-
 
intellectual property acquisitions by dominant firms as a potentially exclu-
sionary practice in violation of sections 2 or 7 of the Clayton Act). Indeed, one 
further implication of our analysis (extending beyond our specific focus on pa-
tent injunctions) may be that the enforcement agencies and the courts should 
be more receptive to arguments that certain patent acquisitions “may . . . sub-
stantially lessen competition” in violation of section 7 of the Clayton Act. Clay-
ton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (2012). For recent discussions of the possible violation 
of section 7 by PAEs, see Ilene Knable Gotts & Scott Sher, The Particular An-
titrust Concerns with Patent Acquisitions, COMP. L. INT’L, Aug. 2012, at 19; 
John “Jay” Jurata, Jr. & Amisha R. Patel, Taming the Trolls: Why Antitrust Is 
Not a Viable Solution for Stopping Patent Assertion Entities, 21 GEO. MASON 
L. REV. 1251, 1259–65 (2014); Erica S. Mintzer & Suzanne Munck, The Joint 
U.S. Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission Workshop on Pa-
tent Assertion Entity Activities—“Follow the Money,” 79 ANTITRUST L.J. 423, 
438–40 (2014); Mark S. Popofsky & Michael D. Laufert, Antitrust Attacks on 
Patent Assertion Entities, 79 ANTITRUST L.J. 445, 453–55 (2014); Mark S. 
Popofsky & Michael D. Laufert, Patent Assertion Entities and Antitrust: Oper-
ating Company Patent Transfers, ANTITRUST SOURCE, Apr. 2013, at 11–12, 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publishing/antitrust_source/ 
apr13_full_source.authcheckdam.pdf; J. Robert Robertson & Logan M. Breed, 
United States v. Widget Co., Newco, and Patent Aggregator Plus LLC: A Hypo-
thetical Closing Argument, 79 ANTITRUST L.J. 527, 531–34 (2014).  
 48. See Trebro, 748 F.3d at 1162, 1164, 1171. 
 49. Trebro’s website indicates that it entered the sod harvester market in 
1999. TREBRO INNOVATIVE SOLUTIONS: COMPANY, http://www.trebro.com/ 
company (last visited Nov. 28, 2015). However, it did not acquire the ‘638 pa-
tent until 2013. Trebro, 748 F.3d at 1162. 
 50. Trebro, 748 F.3d at 1171. 
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ity to exclude these competitors would not have deterred such a 
firm from bringing its own technology to market. Finally, it is 
important to note that, by restricting attention to diagonally in-
tegrated NPEs, our conclusion does not apply to situations in 
which the plaintiff began practicing the disputed patent after 
acquiring it—even though she initially entered the market un-
protected from that technology. In such a case an injunction 
might be necessary to protect the incentive to implement the 
newly acquired technology. 
To verify this result, suppose that there is a second, dis-
tinct technology b that serves as an alternative to technology a. 
That is, a and b are substitute, mutually non-infringing tech-
nologies used as an input in the downstream product. There is 
a downstream firm that is considering developing its idea for 
technology a, but that now also considers the possibility of di-
agonally integrating by acquiring the patent on b, which was 
invented by someone else. Like the patent on a, the added val-
ue of acquiring the patent on b depends on whether it will be 
protected by a property rule or a liability rule. If the firm 
brings a to market, the incremental value of being diagonally 
integrated with respect to b is given by VP(b) if the courts apply 
a property rule and VL(b) if they apply a liability rule. This in-
cremental value consists not only in the value of potentially li-
censing the patent on b, but also in the increased profitability 
of the firm’s own downstream product. These profits increase 
because the patent on b allows the firm to suppress competition 
from competing firms who use b by raising their licensing costs 
or by restricting their access to b. Importantly, the potential to 
suppress competition in this way is much stronger if the courts 
apply a property rule, as the possibility of injunctive relief pro-
vides the ultimate leverage over rivals who utilize b. Finally, 
the price of the patent on b is given by P(b), where VP(b) > VL(b) 
> P(b).51 In what follows we assume that the courts apply a 
property rule to the inventor’s practiced patent on a, and in-
stead focus on the rule applied to its unpracticed patent on b. 
In principle, it is possible that the firm’s interest in b would 
have to be protected by a property rule in order to motivate it to 
bring a to market in the first place. This possibility is described 
by condition (C3).  
 
 51. Here we assume that the patent on technology b is worth buying even 
if the inventor’s interest therein is protected by a liability rule, but this need 
not be the case. However, this alternative need not be separately addressed, as 
our primary conclusion obtains either way. 
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(C3)   ΠP(a) – C(a) + VP(b) – P(b) ≥ R > ΠP(a) – C(a) + VL(b) – 
P(b) 
 
This says that the firm will develop its own idea for a only 
if (1) it can also become a diagonally integrated NPE with re-
spect to b; and (2) its interest in b will be protected by a proper-
ty rule. In these cases we would expect that the firm would as-
sure itself of some protection against b before committing to 
enter the market with technology a. By contrast, it may be that 
the firm would bring a to market even if its interest in b would 
be protected only by a liability rule. This is stated in condition 
(C4).  
 
(C4)   ΠP(a) – C(a) + VP(b) – P(b) > ΠP(a) – C(a) + VL(b) – P(b) ≥ 
R 
 
If (C4) holds, then the court should not enjoin a product 
that infringes the plaintiff’s unpracticed patent on b, because 
this is unnecessary to protect her incentive to develop a. Of 
course, as before, it often may be impossible to determine 
whether a plaintiff’s situation is described by (C3) or by (C4). 
However, if the plaintiff previously engaged in unprotected 
market entry with respect to the disputed technology, then this 
is not so. In this case, the firm’s willingness to bring a to mar-
ket did not depend on having any protection against competing 
products using technology b. That is, the firm did not rely on its 
ability to diagonally integrate with respect to b when it chose to 
develop technology a. This is embodied in condition (C5).  
(C5)   ΠP(a) – C(a) ≥ R 
 
This says that technology a is sufficiently profitable on its 
own to motivate its development, even in lieu of any protection 
against technology b. It follows that the firm’s situation must 
be described by (C4). To see this, note that (C5) directly implies 
(C4). This establishes that, if a diagonally integrated NPE en-
tered the market unprotected from its unpracticed technology, 
then it should never be entitled to enjoin an infringer of that 
technology’s patent. Such an injunction would do nothing to 
promote dynamic welfare. The intuition for this is simple: the 
firm’s decision to bring its own technology to market did not 
depend at all on the possibility of diagonal integration, and 
hence its entry decision could not have depended on what rule 
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might serve to protect such integration. Thus awarding an in-
junction to such a firm will engender all the static harms of in-
junctive relief without affording any offsetting dynamic bene-
fits. Consequently the Federal Circuit’s decision in Trebro is 
not only unnecessary, it is also likely to be harmful.52 
Of course, this result concerns the decision to develop 
technology a, not technology b, whose development we have so 
far taken as given. Thus the reader may be concerned that our 
proposal would dampen the incentive to innovate those tech-
nologies that might be sold to firms hoping to diagonally inte-
grate and enjoin rivals. Indeed, it is true that a rule barring in-
junctions against infringers of a diagonally integrated NPE’s 
unpracticed patent will tend to reduce the amount this NPE 
would pay for the patent. However, this is not problematic, be-
cause no social benefit derives from the sale of a patent to a di-
agonally integrated NPE who, like Trebro, hopes to exclude 
those rivals that might use the patented technology. Such a 
transaction does not lead to any expanded use of the patented 
technology. Thus, developing a technology for this purpose is a 
little like building a factory in the hope that a rival manufac-
turer will acquire it and shut it down. Any spending on re-
search and development motivated purely by this possibility is 
best regarded as deadweight loss. Consequently, there should 
not be any policy for encouraging these transactions.53 
 
 52. Conceivably, there could be cases in which the plaintiff was consider-
ing the acquisition of b when it developed a. One could then imagine a subset 
of these cases in which the decision to develop a hinged on (1) the probability 
that the plaintiff would succeed in acquiring b; and (2) in the event it did so, 
its having the option of enforcing the b patent by means of an injunction. Even 
then, however, granting an injunction against the unauthorized use of b would 
be justified only if the social benefits from the development of a outweighed 
the cost of suppressing competition from b. In our view, allowing injunctions to 
issue based on (what strikes us as) the remote possibility that these conditions 
might be present would be letting the tail wag the dog. Allowing the injunction 
to issue based on proof of these conditions might be feasible, but could sub-
stantially increase adjudication costs.  
 53. One might argue that, even if the assignee intends to use the patent 
only to exclude competitors, the public still gains something in terms of the 
disclosure embodied in the nonused patent. Nevertheless, allowing the assign-
ee to enjoin its competitor from using the patent on b would promote social 
welfare only if the social value of the disclosure that otherwise would not occur 
outweighs the resulting deadweight loss. Although in theory this may be pos-
sible, it seems unlikely given that (1) many, perhaps most, inventions are in-
vented or discovered independently by multiple inventors, see Mark A. Lem-
ley, The Myth of the Sole Inventor, 110 MICH. L. REV. 709 (2012); (2) even if 
only one firm were to invent b during a given period of time, it is reasonable to 
assume that in only a subset of such cases would the firm be motivated to ob-
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We close this section with two important points concerning 
the foregoing analysis. First, while the facts of Trebro may 
seem unusual, our results are in fact widely applicable, particu-
larly in patent-rich industries where patents are frequently 
bought and sold. In recent years, firms in the telecommunica-
tions sector in particular have made strategic acquisitions of 
huge patent portfolios, presumably including large numbers of 
patents that the acquirers themselves do not use.54 These pa-
 
tain a patent only on the expectation that its future assignee would be able to 
use the patent to suppress competition against unpatented products; and (3) 
the social value of what is disclosed in the typical patent is often quite low, 
due to, among other things, patent law’s failure to require working examples, 
see Sean B. Seymore, The Teaching Function of Patents, 85 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 621, 628–32 (2010).  
 54. See, e.g., Scott Morton & Shapiro, supra note 43, at 491–93 (discussing 
acquisitions by Apple, Google, and others); Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Jus-
tice, Office of Pub. Affairs, Statement of the Department of Justice’s Antitrust 
Division on Its Decision To Close Its Investigations of Google Inc.’s Acquisition 
of Motorola Mobility Holdings Inc. and the Acquisitions of Certain Patents by 
Apple Inc., Microsoft Corp. and Research in Motion Ltd. (Feb. 13, 2012), http:// 
www.justice.gov/opa/pr/statement-department-justice-s-antitrust-division-its 
-decision-close-its-investigations (discussing acquisitions by Google, Apple, 
and the Rockstar consortium (consisting of Apple, RIM, Microsoft, Ericsson, 
and Sony)); Chris Foresman, Big Bidding: Apple, Microsoft, RIM Nab Nortel 
Patents for $4.5 Billion, ARSTECHNICA (July 1, 2011), http://arstechnica.com/ 
apple/2011/07/apple-ms-rim-nab-nortel-mobile-patents-for-45-billion; Rhian 
Hunt, Samsung Buys Patents To Use Against Apple (AAPL) in Latest Lawsuit, 
PFHUB (Apr. 24, 2014), http://www.pfhub.com/samsung-buys-patents-to-use 
-against-apple-aapl-in-latest-lawsuit-593; Yoree Koh, Twitter Acquires More 
than 900 Patents from IBM, WALL ST. J.: DIGITS (Jan. 31, 2014), http://blogs 
.wsj.com/digits/2014/01/31/twitter-acquires-ibm-patents; Robert McMillan, 
How Apple and Google Armed 4,000 Patent Warheads, WIRED (May 21, 2012), 
http://www.wired.com/2012/05/rockstar; Cade Metz, Microsoft Shuttles AOL 
Patent Portfolio to Facebook, WIRED (Apr. 23, 2012), http://www.wired.com/ 
2012/04/microsoft-aol-facebook; Phil Milford & Susan Decker, Google Hands 
HTC Patents To Use Against Apple in Smartphone Wars, BLOOMBERG NEWS 
(Sept. 7, 2011), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-09-07/htc-sues-apple 
-alleging-infringement-of-four-u-s-patents.html; Craig Silverman, LinkedIn 
Acquires Major Fact Checking Patents, POYNTER.ORG (June 20, 2014), http:// 
www.poynter.org/latest-news/regret-the-error/256315/linkedin-acquires-the 
-far-reaching-portfolio-of-fact-checking-patents; Bill Slawski, Twitter’s New 
Patent Trove (943 Patents) from IBM, SEO BY THE SEA (Feb. 1, 2014), http:// 
www.seobythesea.com/2014/02/twitters-new-patent-trove-943-patents-ibm; 
Tess Stynes, Qualcomm Acquires Mobile Technology Patents from Hewlett-
Packard, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 23, 2014), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/ 
SB10001424052702303448204579339160154556786; Brian Womack, Facebook 
Is Said To Buy 750 IBM Patents To Boost Defenses, BLOOMBERG NEWS (Mar. 
22, 2012), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-03-22/facebook-is-said-to-buy 
-750-ibm-patents-to-boost-defenses.html; see also Colleen Chien, From Arms 
Race to Marketplace: The Complex Patent Ecosystem and Its Implications for 
the Patent System, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 297, 338, 340 (2010) (stating that a “prac-
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tented technologies may be used by competitors, however, in 
which case the acquiring firms become diagonally integrated 
NPEs. If, prior to acquiring these patent portfolios, such firms 
entered the relevant product markets unprotected from the ac-
quired technologies (as is likely the case in the majority of such 
acquisitions) then they are fundamentally no different from 
Trebro. Such patent acquisitions have not previously been 
viewed in this light, and thus our results provide an improved 
understanding of how they should factor into the discussion of 
patent remedies. Further, as Part III demonstrates, diagonal 
integration is not only widespread, it is also unusually harmful 
to competition and consumers; its effects are substantially 
worse than those that would arise if the patents were owned by 
a standard (unintegrated) NPE. This provides yet another rea-
son for the courts to be particularly cautious when adjudicating 
cases filed by diagonally integrated patent holders. 
Second, our analysis demonstrates that the post-eBay ap-
proach to injunctive relief focuses too narrowly on the marginal 
effects of enjoining the defendant and too little on the plaintiff’s 
incentives at the time of invention. The prevailing method of 
assessing the merits of injunctive relief focuses on the time of 
infringement and involves balancing the interests of the parties 
and the public at large moving forward.55 And, while this in-
volves a number of important considerations, it ignores the 
question of whether the possibility of injunctive relief was ac-
tually a necessary quid pro quo for the plaintiff’s invention. 
This question may be difficult or impossible to answer in many 
situations, but this does not mean the courts should universally 
decline to address it. Rather, the plaintiff’s incentives at the 
time of invention should be the primary point of focus whenev-
er they can be reliably ascertained.56 It is this consideration 
 
tical consequence of the patent arms race,” characterized by a high volume of 
low-cost, low-quality patents, “is that it has left operating companies with 
large numbers of unused patents”). Note that the Rockstar Consortium re-
ferred to in some of the materials above wound down in 2014 and assigned its 
entire portfolio to RPX, a defensive patent aggregator. See Andrew Chung, 
RPX Buys Apple-Backed Rockstar Patents for $900 Million, REUTERS (Dec. 23, 
2014), http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/12/23/us-rpx-rockstar-ip-idUSKBN 
0K11AI20141223. 
 55. See supra note 31 and accompanying text. 
 56. One theoretical exception to our general approach consists in what 
might be called “infringement stacking” by multiple defendants. In principle, 
it could be that multiple defendants are selling different infringing products 
(possibly infringing different components of the plaintiff’s product), and that 
these products are jointly—but not individually—sufficient to undermine the 
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that truly gets at the heart of the patent system’s interest in 
limiting its protections to those inventions that would not oth-
erwise come to market. 
The next Part applies the foregoing insights to other topics 
in patent law where judges and scholars similarly may give too 
little consideration to inventors’ incentives at the development 
stage when assessing the appropriateness of injunctive relief. 
II.  IMPLICATIONS OF UNPROTECTED MARKET ENTRY 
IN OTHER SETTINGS   
One of the two key implications of our model is that it is 
sometimes possible to infer that injunctive relief will reduce so-
cial welfare, based upon the fact that the patent owner was 
willing to enter the market without an expectation of being able 
to enjoin its competitors. In this Part, we examine the implica-
tions of our unprotected market entry analysis to the question 
of whether courts should grant injunctive relief in cases 
brought by patent privateers, owners of FRAND-encumbered 
SEPs, or firms engaged in preemptive patenting. 
 
plaintiff’s decision to develop its patented technology. If the plaintiff can 
demonstrate such widespread infringement, then the courts should award in-
junctions to the extent necessary to protect the plaintiff’s decision to develop 
its product. Thus, when evaluating injunctive relief in a particular case, if pos-
sible an adjudicator should consider not only the harm imposed by the pres-
ently disputed infringement, but also those of other infringing products still 
being sold. 
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A. Patent Privateering57 
In current usage, the term patent “privateer” most com-
monly refers to a patent assertion entity (PAE)58 that acquires 
a patent or portfolio of patents from a practicing entity and 
then seeks to enforce those patents against alleged infringers. 
As part of the contract of assignment, the privateer agrees to 
share the proceeds of its enforcement efforts with the patent 
assignor.59 Privateering appears to be on the rise in both the 
 
 57. The term “patent privateering” was coined by Tom Ewing, who first 
drew an analogy between the practice described in the text above and the 
practice (long since abolished) under which sovereign states would authorize 
merchant vessels to plunder enemy vessels during time of war. See Joff Wild, 
Universities and NPEs: A Match Made in Heaven, IAM MAGAZINE: BLOG (Oct. 
11, 2013), http://www.iam-magazine.com/blog/detail.aspx?g=37a09238-0376 
-4bda-a2ff-9fd0bc6282ca (citing Ewing’s use of the term as quoted in Joff Wild, 
Acacia Turns Privateer as Businesses Decide if You Can’t Beat Them, Join 
Them, IAM MAGAZINE: BLOG (Aug. 28, 2010), http://www.iam-magazine 
.com/blog/detail.aspx?g=2db176e6-77b0-45a0-a999-87910c96394a&q). Ewing 
has written more extensively on the topic than anyone else of which we are 
aware. See Tom Ewing, Indirect Exploitation of Intellectual Property Rights by 
Corporations and Investors: IP Privateering and Modern Letters of Marque 
and Reprisal, 4 HASTINGS SCI. & TECH. L.J. 1, 5 (2012) [hereinafter Ewing, 
Indirect Exploitation]; Tom Ewing, Practical Considerations in the Indirect 
Deployment of Intellectual Property Rights by Corporations and Investors, 4 
HASTINGS SCI. & TECH. L.J. 109 (2012) [hereinafter Ewing, Practical Consid-
erations]; Tom Ewing, Patent Privateering Reloaded, INTELL. ASSET MGMT., 
July–Aug. 2013, at 49 [hereinafter Ewing, Reloaded]; Tom Ewing, Introducing 
the Patent Privateers, INTELL. ASSET MGMT., Jan.–Feb. 2011, at 31 [hereinaf-
ter Ewing, Introducing]. Scott Morton & Shapiro use the term “hybrid PAE” to 
refer to PAEs that have “contractual relationships with downstream firms,” 
which would include some privateers, Scott Morton & Shapiro, supra note 43, 
at 489, while John Golden uses the term “patent privateer” in a sense some-
what different from that presented above in his paper, John Golden, Patent 
Privateers: Private Enforcement’s Historical Survivors, 26 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 
545, 552 n.40 (2013). For other discussions, see, for example, Maurits Dolman, 
Privateers and Trolls Join the Global Patent Wars; Can Competition Authori-
ties Disarm Them?, 37 COMPUTERRECHT 80 (2014); Susan Decker, Patent Pri-
vateers Sail the Legal Waters Against Apple, Google, BLOOMBERG BUS.  
(Jan. 10, 2013), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2013-01-11/patent 
-privateers-sail-the-legal-waters-against-apple-google; Florian Mueller, Nokia 
and Ericsson Seek To Justify Their Privateering Ways, Defend Patent Trans-
fers to NPEs, FOSS PATENTS (May 21, 2015), http://www.fosspatents.com/ 
2015/05/nokia-and-ericsson-seek-to-justify.html. 
 58. See Ewing, Introducing, supra note 57, at 34 (stating that “[a] priva-
teer need not necessarily be an NPE,” but that “an operating company that 
acted as privateer would put itself at risk of a countersuit by the target”). 
 59. See id. Ewing also discusses other forms of privateering, which he 
broadly defines as occurring whenever “operating companies . . . authorise 
third parties to chase their competitors using IP rights,” id. at 31, but the form 
discussed in the text above is most relevant to our discussion. 
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United States60 and may exist in some other countries as well.61 
Like other PAEs and unlike many practicing entities, priva-
teers are largely immune from countersuit for patent infringe-
ment, since they do not make, use, or sell any products them-
selves. As a result, some commentators have expressed concern 
over the unforeseeable consequences of the massive increase in 
patent enforcement to which privateering could give rise,62 
while others have suggested that, at least in some instances, 
privateering could give rise to antitrust or other liability.63 Pri-
vateering’s defenders, on the other hand, characterize the prac-
tice as nothing more than an efficient division of labor, akin to 
outsourcing.64 
We don’t intend to resolve this debate here, but we do 
think that a straightforward application of our analysis sug-
gests that courts should not grant injunctive relief in cases in 
which a privateer has acquired a patent from a firm that was 
not using the patent, and seeks to enforce that patent against 
an alleged infringer who sells products that compete against 
the assignor’s unpatented products.65 To be sure, privateers are 
 
 60. See Ewing, Reloaded, supra note 57 (“[W]e . . . know that privateering 
is on the rise”). Ewing presents some preliminary empirical analysis of the in-
cidence of privateering in the United States in Ewing, Indirect Exploitation, 
supra note 57, at 40–43. 
 61. See Köllner & Weber, supra note 21, at 110–11 (discussing IPCom’s 
activities in Germany). 
 62. See Ewing, Indirect Exploitation, supra note 57, at 89; see also Cathe-
rine Tucker, The Effect of Patent Litigation and Patent Assertion Entities on 
Entrepreneurial Activity 1 (MIT Sloan School Mgmt., Working Paper No. 5095-
14, 2014), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2457611 (reporting an inverted U-shape 
relation between levels of patent litigation and venture capital investment). In 
the copyright sphere, Shyamkrishna Balganesh has argued that much of copy-
right law evolved on the implicit understanding that rights would be underen-
forced. See Shyamkrishna Balganesh, The Uneasy Case Against Copyright 
Trolls, 86 S. CAL. L. REV. 723, 729 (2013). 
 63. See Ewing, Practical Considerations, supra note 57, at 122–26, 138–
50; Popofsky & Laufert, Antitrust Attacks on Patent Assertion Entities, supra 
note 47, at 455–58; Popofsky & Laufert, Patent Assertion Entities and Anti-
trust, supra note 47, at 10–12. 
 64. See Ewing, Introducing, supra note 57, at 37–38. 
 65. We cannot be so confident in cases in which, prior to the assignment, 
the assignor was practicing the patent. Although it may seem less likely that 
an assignment would be made at all under these circumstances, it’s certainly 
not impossible. If the patent reads on a small component of a complex device, 
for example, the patent owner may be better off licensing the patent to com-
petitors and benefiting from its widespread adoption than trying to exclude 
those competitors. Alternatively, the owner may want to avoid provoking a re-
taliatory patent infringement lawsuit. (If the assignee is a PAE and therefore 
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among the class of patent owners who generally are not inter-
ested in ultimately obtaining injunctions, since (as PAEs) they 
sell no products themselves and therefore do not benefit from 
actually excluding competitors. But they could use the threat of 
injunctive relief to negotiate licensing rates, or to settle pend-
ing litigation on terms that are likely to be higher than would 
be the case if injunctions were off the table—the reason being 
that an infringer who actually is enjoined must figure out some 
way to design around the patented technology, and thus would 
be willing to pay a licensing fee that reflects not only the value 
of that technology in comparison with alternatives but also the 
avoided design-around costs.66 These higher royalties, however, 
would appear to be unnecessary to induce the assignor’s entry 
into the relevant product market, where (on our assumed facts) 
the assignor was already selling (unpatented) products in that 
market, and not enforcing the patent subsequently assigned to 
the privateer, prior to that assignment.67 (Indeed, in some in-
 
makes no products, the defendant can’t file a counterclaim for infringement, 
though of course the defendant could retaliate against the assignor if it were 
to discover the assignor’s identity.) Or it may prefer to rely upon the priva-
teer’s expertise in litigating and negotiating a royalty even if this means giv-
ing up the right to exclude. For a more comprehensive discussion of the many 
possible reasons why operating companies and others may find privateering 
attractive, see Ewing, Indirect Exploitation, supra note 57, at 55–73; Ewing, 
Introducing, supra note 57, at 32–34. 
 66. See supra notes 41–42 and accompanying text. 
 67. Admittedly, this inference would be incorrect if the assignor entered 
the market for a conditional on its ability to assign the patent on b to a priva-
teer and to benefit from the privateer’s ability to extract a supracompensatory 
royalty in the shadow of an injunction. This chain of events nevertheless 
strikes us as attenuated, particularly if a substantial amount of time has 
passed in between the assignor’s entry into a and its assignment of b, though 
perhaps one could permit the privateer who requests injunctive relief to pre-
sent evidence of such facts. Similarly, one might imagine a case in which a 
firm developed both a and b before it was clear which technology (say a) was 
likely to better suit its needs. We argue below that if the firm retains its pa-
tent on b there should be no hard-and-fast rule against granting injunctive re-
lief for the infringement of b, because the development of b may have hinged 
on the firm’s expectation that it would be able to enjoin such uses. See infra 
Part II.C. If this is correct, though, why should the rule be any different if the 
patent owner sells the b patent to a privateer, rather than retaining it? The 
answer is that the assignment to the privateer assumes that the privateer ul-
timately will license the patent; the privateer will be able to derive more li-
censing revenue if it can credibly threaten an injunction, but as a nonpractic-
ing entity the privateer has no ultimate interest in excluding users from the 
market. Enjoining the unauthorized use of b in order to preserve the incentive 
to develop b therefore makes sense only if there is evidence that that incentive 
depended on the prospect of deriving a supracompensatory licensing fee based 
on a privateer’s subsequent ability to threaten injunctive relief. Whether the 
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stances, the firm that assigns the patent to the privateer may 
have acquired that patent after entering the market, in which 
case the fact pattern is, for all intents and purposes, identical 
to that of Trebro.)68 The assignor’s pre-assignment behavior 
therefore provides us with evidence from which it is reasonable 
to infer that condition (C5) is satisfied, and therefore that the 
privateer should not be able to enjoin the infringement of b.69 
 
benefit of permitting such (possibly self-serving) evidence in either case out-
weighs the likely cost is a judgment call. 
The argument in the text above might also seem to suggest that courts 
should deny injunctive relief even if the assignor didn’t assign the patent to a 
privateer, but rather decided to enforce the patent itself after having tolerated 
its infringement for a period of time. Such a rule, however, would require 
courts to determine after what period of time it is reasonable to infer that (C5) 
is satisfied, a fact that might be extremely difficult to ascertain. What the pri-
vateering example adds to the mix is that the assignor clearly contemplates 
third-party use of the patented technology, which (coupled with the assignor’s 
unprotected entry) makes it reasonable to infer that injunctive relief is unnec-
essary to induce the assignor’s entry in the market for a. Conceivably, though, 
the equitable doctrines of laches or estoppel might preclude a suit for injunc-
tive relief or damages in a case in which the patent owner unreasonably delays 
enforcing its patent. See, e.g., Petrella v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 134 S. 
Ct. 1962, 1974 n.15 (2014); SCA Hygiene Prods. Aktiebolag v. First Quality 
Baby Prods., L.L.C., 767 F.3d 1339, 1344–45 (Fed. Cir. 2014), rehearing en 
banc granted, 2014 WL 7460970 (Fed. Cir. Dec. 30, 2014). 
 68. See Ewing, Introducing, supra note 57, at 33 (positing an example in 
which “an incumbent’s market position is being etched away by an upstart 
competitor employing a replacement technology,” but neither firm “holds IP 
rights that it could effectively use against the other”; in such a case, to employ 
a patent against the upstart, the incumbent would have to obtain the patent 
from a third party, but may prefer to outsource its enforcement for various 
reasons). 
 69. As in our example derived from the facts of Trebro in Part I, one might 
ask whether denying the privateer the ability to threaten an injunction might 
reduce the incentive to invent b. Perhaps firms would invest more in develop-
ing or acquiring patents if they expected to be able to sell some of those pa-
tents to privateers in exchange for some portion of the royalties the privateer 
is able to extract. According to Ewing, however, some transfers to privateers 
are motivated less by the assignor’s expectation of a share of the royalties than 
by the desire to impede competition. See Ewing, Indirect Exploitation, supra 
note 57, at 32–36, 55–58; Ewing, Introducing, supra note 57, at 32–36. Moreo-
ver, some empirical evidence suggests that (in general) only a small percent-
age of PAE licensing revenue make its way back to inventors. See James E. 
Bessen & Michael J. Meurer, The Direct Costs from NPE Disputes, 99 COR-
NELL L. REV. 388, 410–11 (2014) (asserting that, at most, 20% of defendants’ 
payments to NPEs go to patentees); Michael Risch, Patent Troll Myths, 42 SE-
TON HALL L. REV. 457, 461 (2012) (“[T]he evidence does not support a theory 
that NPEs incentivize investment by providing a market for patents,” alt-
hough they do “provide a better way for individual inventors to enforce their 
patents than bringing lawsuits themselves.”); cf. David L. Schwartz & Jay P. 
Kesan, Essay, Analyzing the Role of Non-Practicing Entities in the Patent Sys-
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And if it cannot actually obtain an injunction, it cannot credibly 
threaten to do so either. 
Concededly, U.S. courts post-eBay are likely to deny priva-
teers and other PAEs injunctions anyway.70 Nevertheless, our 
analysis provides some additional reasons not to do so, and 
might be particularly helpful in non-U.S. jurisdictions that are 
still determining when, if ever, to award prevailing patent 
owners prospective damages in lieu of injunctive relief.71 Alter-
natively, as discussed below,72 if we are right in concluding that 
injunctive relief would always or almost always reduce social 
welfare in an identifiable class of cases, perhaps it would be 
appropriate for competition law to develop a response, at least 
as a second-best solution in jurisdictions that adhere to a pre-
eBay view of the prevailing patentee’s right to obtain a perma-
nent injunction.  
B. FRAND-ENCUMBERED SEPS 
A rationale similar to that sketched out above also might 
apply to cases involving FRAND-encumbered SEPs. As noted 
earlier, SSOs often require their members to disclose any rele-
vant patents before the standard under consideration is adopt-
ed, to declare any patents that are essential to the standard 
once the standard is chosen, and to commit to licensing those 
patents on FRAND terms (or else to exit the SSO).73 Initially, 
one might wonder why an SEP owner that makes products 
 
tem, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 426, 443–44 (2014) (faulting Bessen & Meurer’s es-
timate above, on the ground that it is based largely on three large firms—
InterDigital, Tessera, and Rambus—that conduct much of their own R&D in-
house); Bessen & Meurer, supra, at 419 (responding to Schwartz & Kesan). 
Conceivably, though, if a court were concerned about this possibility, it could 
allow the privateer to elicit contrary evidence in support of an injunction, sub-
ject to the caveats noted supra note 67. 
Finally, note that the incentive we are discussing here is premised on the 
privateer’s ability to extract what we have termed a supracompensatory royal-
ty, based in part on the infringer’s avoided switching costs. See supra text ac-
companying notes 41–42. In the following section, we argue that the patent 
incentive does not depend upon the ability to extract these costs. See infra 
notes 94–95 and accompanying text.  
 70. See supra note 23 and accompanying text. 
 71. At present, most of the world’s major patent litigation systems award 
injunctive relief to the prevailing patent owner more or less automatically, and 
do not follow eBay. For discussion, see COTTER, supra note 29, at 176–84, 245–
48, 305–07. 
 72. See infra notes 96–99 and accompanying text. 
 73. See supra note 27. 
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(say, a smartphone manufacturer) and that competes with oth-
er firms that make rival products and therefore might benefit 
from a FRAND license covering the SEP would ever commit to 
such licensing.74 Wouldn’t the owner be better off using its pa-
tent to exclude rather than license competitors? The answer is, 
not necessarily. 
One reason firms join SSOs and thus commit to FRAND li-
censing is that membership in an SSO guarantees that the firm 
will be able to participate in the standard-setting process (and 
thus, perhaps, influence that process in a manner that benefits 
them). Moreover, it is in the collective interest of the SSO 
membership to ensure that each member will have access to all 
of the members’ patents that are needed to practice the stand-
ard. Smartphone Company A therefore may find it beneficial to 
commit to FRAND license its SEPs to Smartphone Company B, 
in return for the latter’s commitment to do likewise.75 In short, 
firms participate in SSOs because they conclude it is in their 
interest to do so, even though they may be giving something up 
in the process. 
In several recent cases in both the United States and 
abroad, the question has arisen whether a firm that makes a 
FRAND commitment generally gives up the right to injunctive 
relief, or whether it is still appropriate to request an injunction 
if the firm and the alleged infringer are unable to agree on 
what a FRAND royalty would be.76 At first blush, our analysis 
would appear to support the view that courts generally should 
deny injunctions to owners of FRAND-encumbered SEPs, be-
 
 74. Relatedly, one also might wonder why SEP owners who sell the com-
ponents used in products such as smartphones so frequently commit to 
FRAND, instead of keeping open the option of exclusive licensing (an option 
that firms in other industries sometimes find to their advantage). For discus-
sion of the various patented technologies that can be found in the typical 
smartphone, and who owns those technologies, see Ann Armstrong et al., The 
Smartphone Royalty Stack: Surveying Royalty Demands for the Components 
Within Modern Smartphones (2014), https://www.wilmerhale.com/uploaded 
Files/Shared_Content/Editorial/Publications/Documents/The-Smartphone 
-Royalty-Stack-Armstrong-Mueller-Syrett.pdf.  
 75. Since many SSOs require FRAND licensing even to nonmembers, one 
might imagine there would be cases in which a firm would be better off exiting 
an SSO, or never joining it in the first place, and enjoying the benefits of 
members’ FRAND commitments without having to reciprocate. For a theoreti-
cal discussion of firms’ incentives to join or exit SSOs, see Anne Layne-Farrar 
et al., Payments and Participation: The Incentives To Join Cooperative Stand-
ard Setting Efforts, 23 J. ECON. & MGMT. STRATEGY 24 (2014). 
 76. See infra notes 79–82, 96–99 and accompanying text. 
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cause the owner’s decision to commit to FRAND licensing (in-
stead of exiting) indicates that it viewed the benefits of wide-
spread licensing on FRAND terms as outweighing the benefits 
of excluding downstream users. In other words, to the extent a 
firm joins or remains in an SSO and therefore commits to 
FRAND licensing, it cannot seriously argue that its incentive to 
innovate depended on its ability to exclude, since it knew going 
in that it would have to license its SEPs. Thus, as in the cases 
we discussed in Parts I and II.A, the patentee in this example 
arguably has revealed that its incentive to innovate did not de-
pend upon its ability to exclude downstream users. If this is 
correct, an injunction would appear to generate social harm in 
the form of deadweight loss, with no corresponding social bene-
fit. 
This analysis nevertheless falls short of proving that SEP 
owners should rarely or never be allowed to obtain injunctions. 
SSOs themselves generally do not define what a FRAND com-
mitment means, and before the standard is adopted firms 
themselves rarely disclose the terms on which they intend to 
license their patents.77 The principal reason that SSOs do not 
require more detail up front is one of cost: given the large num-
bers of SEPs that may read on a given standard, the inherent 
difficulty in valuing new technology, and the time it would take 
to work out the relevant terms and conditions pre-adoption, the 
most efficient procedure may be simply to require firms to 
commit to FRAND and work out the details later.78 As a conse-
quence, however, there may be disputes over whether the terms 
 
 77. There are some exceptions. A few SSOs require royalty-free licensing, 
see Jay P. Kesan & Carol M. Hayes, FRAND’s Forever: Standards, Patent 
Transfers, and Licensing Commitments, 89 IND. L.J. 231, 244 n.81 (2014), 
while others require members to announce their maximum terms in advance, 
see Jorge L. Contreras, Technical Standards and Ex Ante Disclosure: Results 
and Analysis of an Empirical Study, 53 JURIMETRICS J. 163, 173–75 (2013). 
Most SSOs do not impose these requirements, however. 
 78. See Doug Lichtman, Understanding the RAND Commitment, 47 
HOUS. L. REV. 1023, 1027–29 (2010) (stating that among the reasons firms 
“might prefer the ambiguous RAND commitment over a more conventional, 
explicit pricing term” are that “intricate negotiations over patent validity and 
patent value would take an enormous amount of time”; that “standard-setting 
is a process run by engineers, not lawyers”; that “many new technologies flop”; 
and that “RAND allows implementing firms to wait for additional information 
before they commit to a specific royalty structure”). Potentially, there could 
also be antitrust problems if the SSO itself set license terms. For discussion, 
see Thomas F. Cotter, Reflections on the Antitrust Modernization Commis-
sion’s Report and Recommendations Relating to the Antitrust/IP Interface, 53 
ANTITRUST BULL. 745, 786–94 (2008); Lichtman, supra, at 1046 n.65. 
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a particular SEP owner is demanding (or that a prospective us-
er is willing to accept) fall within the FRAND range. In such 
cases, SEP owners would like to reserve the right to obtain in-
junctive relief, since this option provides them with greater lev-
erage in negotiating a rate. Users, on the other hand, prefer 
that if the parties cannot agree, the SEP owner sues for in-
fringement, and the patent is found to be valid and infringed, 
the court itself will determine the FRAND royalty and award 
the owner damages based on that royalty for the user’s past 
and future use of the SEP. To date, a handful of federal courts 
have sided with the users’ position on this issue,79 as have the 
federal antitrust agencies and the United States Patent and 
Trademark Office.80 The United States International Trade 
Commission, on the other hand, so far has taken the opposite 
view,81 as have some courts in other countries.82 
 
 79. The Federal Circuit recently affirmed Judge Posner’s decision that 
Motorola would not be entitled to an injunction for Apple’s alleged infringe-
ment of a Motorola SEP, albeit without creating a per se rule against such in-
junctions. See Apple, Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., 757 F.3d 1286, 1322 (Fed. Cir. 
2014); see also Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., No. C10-1823JLR, 2012 WL 
5993202, at *6–7 (W.D. Wash. Nov. 30, 2012) (concluding that Motorola would 
not have been entitled to a permanent injunction against Microsoft’s alleged 
infringement of Motorola’s FRAND-encumbered SEPs). In at least two other 
cases, SEP owners chose not to request injunctive relief and the trier of fact 
determined the amount of damages. See In re Innovatio IP Ventures, L.L.C. 
Patent Litig., MDL Docket No. 2303, Case No. 11 C 9308, 2013 WL 5593609 
(N.D. Ill. Oct. 3, 2013); Ericsson Inc. v. D-Link Sys., Case No. 6:10-CV-473, 
2013 WL 4046225 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 6, 2013). 
 80. See Matter of Motorola Mobility L.L.C. and Google Inc., Docket No. C-
4410, File No. 121-0120, 2013 WL 3944149 (F.T.C. July 24, 2013); U.S. DEP’T 
OF JUSTICE & U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, POLICY STATEMENT ON 
REMEDIES FOR STANDARDS-ESSENTIAL PATENTS SUBJECT TO VOLUNTARY 
F/RAND COMMITMENTS (Jan. 8, 2013), http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/ 
files/atr/legacy/2014/09/18/290994.pdf. 
 81. See Certain Elec. Commc’n Devices, Portable Music and Data Pro-
cessing Devices, and Tablet Computers, Inv. No. 337-TA-794, at 41–64, 107–14 
(July 5, 2013) (Commission Opinion). U.S. Trade Representative Michael 
Froman subsequently exercised his authority to disapprove the exclusion or-
der, however. See Letter from Ambassador Michael B.G. Froman to Honorable 
Irving A. Williamson, Chairman, U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n (Aug. 3, 2013) 
https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/08032013%20Letter_1.pdf. Nevertheless, in 
another more recent ITC investigation, Administrative Law Judge Essex con-
cluded that InterDigital did not breach its FRAND obligation by seeking an 
exclusion order against several alleged infringers. See Certain Wireless Devic-
es with 3G and/or 4G Capabilities and Components Thereof, Inv. No. 337-TA-
868 (June 26, 2014) (Initial Determination). 
 82. For discussion through 2013, see Cotter, supra note 32. As noted be-
low, however, there are some foreign cases denying SEP owners injunctions on 
the basis of antitrust or other bodies of law. See infra notes 96–99 and accom-
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We think the following observations are relevant to the 
correct resolution of these issues. First, as already noted, in 
cases in which the SEP owner made a FRAND commitment, it 
is reasonable to assume that the owner’s incentive to invent did 
not depend on the expectation of ultimately enforcing injunc-
tions against end users, since the owner voluntarily chose to 
remain in the SSO and to commit to FRAND licensing. An ap-
propriate royalty therefore should suffice to preserve this in-
centive.83 Second, however, like the privateers we discussed in 
the preceding section, SEP owners nevertheless may value be-
ing able to threaten an injunction in the event accused infring-
ers are unwilling to meet their demands. Third, SEP owners 
are different from privateers in some ways that might make it 
more challenging to predict the impact of injunctive relief on 
inventor behavior. In the privateering example, we could state 
with confidence that the privateer’s interest in threatening an 
injunction to obtain supracompensatory royalties for b did not 
motivate the assignor to enter the market for a, because (on our 
assumed facts) prior to the assignment the assignor was not us-
ing the b patent to shield a from competition.84 We also sug-
gested that the privateer’s conduct may have little bearing on 
the incentive to invent b, particularly if (as may often be the 
case) inventors reap only a small share of the privateer’s boo-
ty.85 In the present context, however, the analysis centers on 
just one patent, a, and perhaps the patent owner credibly could 
argue that the additional leverage a threatened injunction pro-
vides increases its own incentive to invest in the inventions like 
a, by increasing the expected royalties to be derived from oth-
ers’ use of a.86 
 
panying text. 
 83. Note that, while we stated above that our analysis would be limited to 
cases involving inadvertent infringement, it may be appropriate to dispense 
with this requirement in the present context, at least in cases in which the al-
leged infringer is willing to negotiate a license but the parties cannot reach 
agreement on its terms. Detailed discussion of this matter is beyond the scope 
of this Article, but the question of whether courts should require evidence that 
a defendant is a “willing licensee”—and if so, precisely what this means—
before dispensing with injunctive relief is, at present, very much a live issue in 
both the United States and Europe.  
 84. See supra notes 65–69 and accompanying text. 
 85. See supra note 69. 
 86. See Bernhard Ganglmair et al., Patent Hold-Up and Antitrust: How a 
Well-Intentioned Rule Could Retard Innovation, 60 J. INDUS. ECON. 249, 261–
62 (2012) (arguing that limiting the patentee to FRAND damages may nega-
tively affect the incentive to innovate). There is also the possibility that if the 
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We can’t rule out this possibility, but we remain skeptical 
for two reasons. First, given that the SEP owner’s willingness 
to innovate depends, ultimately, on receiving adequate mone-
tary compensation and not on exclusion, an appropriate royalty 
should be sufficient to induce a’s invention. In this regard, fed-
eral law authorizes courts to award not only compensatory 
damages,87 but also prejudgment interest88 (which may be com-
pounded)89 plus (in an appropriate case) attorneys’ fees90 and 
enhanced damages for willful infringement.91 Thus, while SEP 
owners may foresee even higher royalties if they can bargain in 
the shadow of an injunction, courts appear to have adequate 
tools to award them the FRAND royalty they could have ex-
pected ex ante. Absent some reason to believe that courts sys-
tematically are likely to err in favor of defendants,92 there is no 
 
consequences of joining an SSO are more onerous than the consequences of 
remaining outside, some firms will have an incentive to remain outside, thus 
reducing some of the social benefits of having SSOs in the first place. See 
Layne-Farrar et al., supra note 75, at 25. Although the issue is beyond the 
scope of this Article, this possibility might lead one to conclude that courts 
should apply the same damages and injunction rules to SEPs regardless of 
whether the SEP is FRAND-encumbered.  
 87. See 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2012) (“Upon finding for the claimant the court 
shall award the claimant damages adequate to compensate for the infringe-
ment, but in no event less than a reasonable royalty for the use made of the 
invention by the infringer, together with interest and costs as fixed by the 
court.”). 
 88. See General Motors Corp. v. Devex Corp., 461 U.S. 648, 657 (1983); see 
also PATENT DAMAGES HANDBOOK COMM., COMPENSATORY DAMAGES ISSUES 
IN PATENT INFRINGEMENT CASES: A HANDBOOK FOR FEDERAL DISTRICT COURT 
JUDGES 3 (2010), https://www.law.berkeley.edu/files/bclt_PatentDamages_Ed 
.pdf (“[T]he court may award pre-judgment interest under 35 U.S.C. § 284 on 
the compensatory portion of the damages award, pre-judgment interest on any 
award of attorney fees, and post-judgment interest under Fed. R. Civ. P. 37 on 
the entire award.”).  
 89. See Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., 56 F.3d 1538, 1555 (Fed. Cir. 1995) 
(en banc) (stating that, while “‘an award of compound rather than simple in-
terest assures that the patent owner is fully compensated.’ . . . the determina-
tion whether to award simple or compound interest is a matter largely within 
the discretion of the district court” (citations omitted)). 
 90. See 35 U.S.C. § 285 (stating that “[t]he court in exceptional cases may 
award reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing party”); Octane Fitness, 
L.L.C. v. Icon Health & Fitness, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1749, 1756 (2014) (“[C]ourts 
may determine whether a case is ‘exceptional’ in the case-by-case exercise of 
their discretion, considering the totality of the circumstances.”). 
 91. See 35 U.S.C. § 284 (“[T]he court may increase the damages up to 
three times the amount found or assessed.”); Cohesive Techs., Inc. v. Waters 
Corp., 543 F.3d 1351, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (stating that enhanced damages 
are available only for “willful” infringement). 
 92. Compare Einer Elhauge, Do Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking 
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obvious reason to conclude that a damages remedy would con-
found the patentee’s investment-backed expectations.93 
Our second ground for skepticism arises from the fact that 
the leverage a threatened injunction provides is due to the im-
plementer’s having incurred sunk costs in implementing the 
patented technology and to the costs of switching to a nonin-
fringing technology.94 Ex post, the infringer would be willing to 
pay a royalty that would reflect these costs. As one of us argues 
in a companion piece, however, there is no obvious reason to 
conclude that innovation incentives depend on the SEP owner’s 
ability to extract these costs, which bear no relationship to the 
value of the patented technology over alternatives.95 If this rea-
soning is correct, it may provide an adequate ground for deny-
ing SEP owners injunctive relief independent of our unprotect-
ed market entry analysis. Nevertheless, we think the latter 
provides an additional reason for doubting the efficiency of in-
junctions in SEP cases, and therefore strengthens the anti-
injunction position. 
As noted above, courts outside the United States by and 
large have not embraced the eBay standard, and continue to 
award prevailing patent owners injunctions as a matter of 
 
Lead to Systematically Excessive Royalties?, 4 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 535, 
557–58 (2008) (arguing that damages are likely to be undercompensatory due 
to factors such as hindsight bias, difficulties that patent owners may face in 
communicating value to juries, damages estimation techniques that 
shortchange accuracy for administrative ease, and selection bias), with Cotter, 
supra note 32, at 345 (critiquing Elhauge).  
 93. One occasionally hears the argument that, if the court simply awards 
the FRAND royalty, there is no incentive on the part of alleged infringers to 
negotiate. On this view, patentees bear all the risk of litigation (including a 
finding of noninfringement or invalidity) and therefore may be willing to settle 
for an undercompensatory royalty. This argument ignores the potential down-
side facing the defendant, however, including not only its own attorneys’ fees 
but the other consequences noted in the text above. It also arguably downplays 
the significance of the fact that (as a general matter) in patent cases litigated 
to judgment, patent owners win only about 30% of the time. See John R. Alli-
son et al., Understanding the Realities of Modern Patent Litigation, 92 TEX. L. 
REV. 1769, 1787–88 (2014). Approximately 40% of all litigated patents are in-
validated, see id. at 1787, and by some estimates over 50% of all patents de-
clared essential aren’t, see FAIRFIELD RES. INT’L, INC., REVIEW OF PATENTS 
DECLARED AS ESSENTIAL TO LTE AND SAE (4G WIRELESS STANDARDS) 
THROUGH JUNE 30, 2009 2 (2010), http://www.frlicense.com/LTE%20Final% 
20Report.pdf; FAIRFIELD RES. INT’L, INC., REVIEW OF PATENTS DECLARED AS 
ESSENTIAL TO WCDMA THROUGH DECEMBER, 2008 2 (2009), http://www 
.frlicense.com/wcdma1.pdf. 
 94. See supra notes 42–43 and accompanying text. 
 95. See Siebrasse & Cotter, supra note 33. 
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course. Courts in some countries nevertheless sometimes have 
found exceptions to this rule in other bodies of law. The Euro-
pean Commission, for example, recently concluded that owners 
of FRAND-encumbered SEPs may be liable under European 
competition law’s “abuse of dominant position” doctrine, if they 
persist in seeking injunctive relief against willing licensees.96 
(The Court of Justice of the European Union will be addressing 
this issue in a different case sometime in the near future.)97 
Similarly, courts in Japan98 and the Netherlands99 have held 
that SEP owners may be barred from obtaining injunctions un-
der the civil law doctrine of “abuse of right” if they refuse to 
honor their FRAND commitments. Without expressing a view 
on the merits of these cases—or the comparative advantages or 
 
 96. See European Commission Press Release IP/14/490, Antitrust: Com-
mission Accepts Legally Binding Commitments by Samsung Electronics on 
Standard Essential Patent Injunctions (Apr. 29, 2014), http://europa.eu/rapid/ 
press-release_IP-14-490_en.htm; European Commission Press Release 
IP/14/489, Antitrust: Commission Finds that Motorola Mobility Infringed EU 
Competition Rules by Misusing Standard Essential Patents (Apr. 29, 2014), 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-14-489_en.htm; European Commission 
Memorandum, Antitrust Decisions on Standard Essential Patents (SEPs)—
Motorola Mobility and Samsung Electronics—Frequently Asked Questions 
(Apr. 29, 2014), http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-14-322_en.htm. 
 97. More specifically, a German court referred to the Court of Justice of 
the European Union a series of questions relating to whether it is an abuse of 
dominant position for the owner of a FRAND-encumbered SEP to seek and en-
force an injunction when the infringer has expressed its willingness to negoti-
ate a FRAND license. See Request for a Preliminary Ruling from the Landger-
icht Düsseldorf (Germany), Case C-170/13, Huawei Technologies Co. Ltd v. 
ZTE Corp., ZTE Deutschland GmbH, (Apr. 5, 2013), http://curia.europa 
.eu/juris (type “C-170/13” into “Case Number” field; then follow “list of docu-
ments” hyperlink; then view document titled “Application (OJ)”). 
 98. See Chiteki Zaisan Kōtō Saibansho [Intellectual Prop. High Ct.] May 
16, 2014, no. 10043, SAIBANSHO SAIBANREI JŌHŌ [SAIBANSHO WEB], http:// 
www.ip.courts.go.jp/eng/vcms_lf/25ne10043full.pdf; Chiteki Zaisan Kōtō Sai-
bansho [Intellectual Prop. High Ct.] May 16, 2014, no. 10007, SAIBANSHO SAI-
BANREI JŌHŌ [SAIBANSHO WEB], http://www.ip.courts.go.jp/eng/vcms_lf/ 
25_ra_10007zenbun.pdf; Chiteki Zaisan Kōtō Saibansho [Intellectual Prop. 
High Ct.] May 16, 2014, no. 10008, SAIBANSHO SAIBANREI JŌHŌ [SAIBANSHO 
WEB], http://www.ip.courts.go.jp/eng/vcms_lf/25_ra_10008zenbun.pdf. 
 99. See Rechtbank’s-Gravenhage 14 mars 2012, HA ZA 11-2212, HA ZA 
11-2213, HA ZA 11-2215 (Samsung Elecs. Co./Apple Inc.), http://uitspraken 
.rechtspraak.nl/inziendocument?id=ECLI:NL:RBSGR:2012:BV8871. For dis-
cussion in English, see Michael Fröhlich & Gertjan Kuipers, FRAND and In-
junctive Relief, AIPPI E-NEWS, NO. 25 (July 2012), https://www.aippi.org/ 
enews/2012/edition25/Michael_Frohlich.html; Florian Mueller, Samsung Suf-
fers Second and Even More Important FRAND Defeat to Apple in the Nether-
lands, FOSS PATENTS (Mar. 14, 2012), http://www.fosspatents.com/2012/03/ 
samsung-suffers-second-and-even-more.html. 
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disadvantages of these other bodies of law to resolve them—we 
note only that, as a matter of policy, they may be correct in 
denying injunctions in a setting in which the anticompetitive 
effect of that remedy likely outweighs any benefit to dynamic 
efficiency. Perhaps our analysis could play a role as these coun-
tries continue to grapple with cases involving PAEs and SEPs.  
C. PREEMPTIVE PATENTING 
In Part I, we showed that when (as in Trebro) a firm that 
sells products covered by technology a acquires from a third 
party a patent on technology b, courts should not enjoin inad-
vertent infringers from using the b patent, but instead should 
award only a reasonable royalty. On these facts, injunctive re-
lief causes an unambiguous social welfare loss.100 A natural ex-
tension of our analysis would be to consider whether courts 
should award injunctions when the firm selling products cov-
ered by technology a itself invents and patents technology b. In-
itially, one might think that, if our preceding analysis is cor-
rect, it shouldn’t matter whether the firm acquired b from a 
third party or developed it in-house; the welfare consequences 
of injunctive relief should be the same. As discussed below, 
however, although we suspect that this may be right, we cannot 
be quite as confident as in our preceding examples that injunc-
tions necessarily disserve the public interest. 
The fact pattern we are discussing in this section bears 
some resemblance to a phenomenon, known as “preemptive pa-
tenting,” that is said to occur when a firm obtains a patent that 
it does not intend to use itself or license, because the invention 
would compete with some other product the firm already pro-
duces and the firm expects that, on net, its aggregate profits 
would go down if it produced both products.101 Theoretical 
 
 100. See supra notes 52–53 and accompanying text. 
 101. See BLAIR & COTTER, supra note 3, at 248–50; Blair & Cotter, supra 
note 28. Preemptive patenting is distinct from so-called predatory innovation, 
which is said to occur when social or consumer welfare decreases as a result of 
a firm’s acquisition or extension of monopoly power through the introduction 
of new products against which its rivals cannot effectively compete. In theory, 
predatory innovation could be viewed as an attempt to monopolize, in violation 
of section 2 of the Sherman Act. Because innovation typically enhances long-
run social welfare, however, even when it results in a firm’s temporary acqui-
sition of monopoly power, in practice courts have been quite reluctant to em-
brace predatory innovation theories as a basis for antitrust liability. For an 
overview of the economic literature and case law, see, for example, CHRISTO-
PHER R. LESLIE, ANTITRUST LAW AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: CAS-
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analysis of the phenomenon typically begins with a model in 
which two firms, an incumbent and an upstart, are engaged in 
a race to patent a new technology.102 If the incumbent wins the 
race, it may suppress the new technology if the expected profits 
from sales of products incorporating that technology are lower 
than the expected profits it will lose from sales of products in-
corporating the old technology. When preemptive patenting oc-
curs, consumers lose out in the short run, because the patent 
shields the old product from competition without increasing 
output; the effect is the same as in Trebro. Moreover, while the 
patent incentive may have spurred the incumbent to invent 
and disclose the new technology, if the firm that lost the race 
would have succeeded in independently inventing the new 
technology the only long-run benefit of awarding the patent to 
the incumbent is the marginal benefit of its earlier disclosure, 
which could be negligible. Nevertheless, the leading economic 
models suggest that preemptive patenting is a rational busi-
ness strategy only if (1) before the race begins, the incumbent’s 
product has few if any commercial substitutes; (2) the incum-
bent races with only one (or at most, a small number) of poten-
tial competitors; and (3) the expected outcome of the inventive 
process is relatively certain.103 Economists by and large have 
expressed doubts as to whether the combination of these three 
conditions is common enough for preemptive patenting to hap-
 
ES AND MATERIALS 227–31 (2011).  
 102. See, e.g., Drew Fudenberg et al., Preemption, Leapfrogging and Com-
petition in Patent Races, 22 EUR. ECON. REV. 3, 5–8 (1983); Richard J. Gilbert, 
Patents, Sleeping Patents, and Entry Deterrence, in STRATEGY, PREDATION, 
AND ANTITRUST ANALYSIS 205, 212–22 (Steven C. Salop ed., 1981); Richard J. 
Gilbert & David M.G. Newbery, Preemptive Patenting and the Persistence of 
Monopoly, 72 AM. ECON. REV. 514, 515–17 (1982); Jennifer F. Reinganum, Un-
certain Innovation and the Persistence of Monopoly, 73 AM. ECON. REV. 741, 
741–43 (1983); Stephen W. Salant, Preemptive Patenting and the Persistence of 
Monopoly: Comment, 74 AM. ECON. REV. 247, 247–50 (1984); John Vickers, 
Pre-Emptive Patenting, Joint Ventures, and the Persistence of Oligopoly, 3 
INT’L J. INDUS. ORG. 261, 262–63 (1985). 
 103. See Gilbert & Newbery, supra note 102, at 522–25; Richard S. Gilbert 
& Steven C. Sunshine, Incorporating Dynamic Efficiency Concerns in Merger 
Analysis: The Use of Innovation Markets, 63 ANTITRUST L.J. 569, 578 (1995); 
Reinganum, supra note 102, at 745–46; see also Fudenberg et al., supra note 
102, at 10–21 (arguing that upstarts can leapfrog over incumbents when the 
inventive process is stochastic and occurs in multiple stages, or when firms’ 
knowledge of their competitors’ R&D is imperfect); Salant, supra note 102  
(arguing that preemptive patenting will not occur as long as transaction costs 
are sufficiently low for the incumbent and the upstart to negotiate licenses or 
assignments). 
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pen very often.104 
Of course, even if preemptive patenting is uncommon, if 
and when it does occur it is likely to reduce social welfare. 
Moreover, the fact pattern we are considering in this section—
where a firm that makes and sells products using technology a 
invents and patents technology b, but then neither uses nor li-
censes its b patent—isn’t necessarily limited to cases in which 
the firm set out intending to preempt other firms from using b, 
and thus arguably incorporates a larger swath of cases than 
those involving preemptive patenting as such. In other words, 
even if firms rarely set out intending to preempt their rivals by 
patenting technology that will thereafter lie idle, one might ar-
gue nevertheless that denying the firm an injunction for the in-
fringement of b increases social welfare, because the prospect of 
injunctive relief was unnecessary to induce the firm’s entry into 
the market for a. The effect is the same, regardless of intent. 
The problem with the preceding argument, as we see it, is 
that we can’t be as confident as in the Trebro fact pattern that 
denial of an injunction will have no impact on the incentive to 
invent b.105 When the firm decides to invest in the development 
of b, it may have no idea whether b is likely to be commercially 
successful or what all of its potential uses may be. Indeed, even 
after the patent issues, these matters may remain unclear; the 
 
 104. See F. M. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC 
PERFORMANCE 452 (2d ed. 1980) (concluding that preemptive patenting is less 
widespread than is commonly believed); Gilbert, supra note 102, at 211, 239–
57, 269 (describing preemptive patenting as “exceptional”); Gilbert & New-
bery, supra note 102, at 514 (same); Reinganum, supra note 102, at 746. Some 
authors have argued, however, that the empirical evidence points to several 
historical examples of “technology suppression,” which may or may not involve 
preemptive patenting. See Kurt M. Saunders, Patent Nonuse and the Role of 
Public Interest, 15 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 389, 391–96 (2002); Kurt M. Saunders 
& Linda Levine, Better, Faster, Cheaper—Later: What Happens When Tech-
nologies Are Suppressed, 11 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 23, 37–41 
(2004); see also Dominique Guellec et al., Pre-Emptive Patenting: Securing 
Market Exclusion and Freedom of Operation, 21 ECON. INNOV. & NEW TECH. 1, 
20 (2012) (reporting results of an investigation of patent filings in the Europe-
an Patent Office suggesting that competitors sometimes file low-quality appli-
cations to block patenting by others). 
 105. We noted the potential impact on the incentive to invent and patent b 
in the Trebro example, where the firm acquires the patent on b from a third 
party. In theory, third parties might be marginally less motivated to invent 
and patent b because potential assignees like Trebro will pay less to acquire 
the patent on b if they could demand only a reasonable royalty for the use of b. 
Even if this somewhat attenuated causal chain obtains in some instances, 
however, this reduction in the third party’s incentive to invent and patent b 
isn’t necessarily a bad thing. See supra note 53 and accompanying text. 
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patent may sit idle while the firm decides whether to retool its 
plant to enable it to use b, or while it searches for an appropri-
ate licensee.106 A no-injunction rule nevertheless effectively 
commits the firm, in advance, to license its b patent to competi-
tors on a nonexclusive basis, and on these facts we cannot rule 
out the possibility that if faced with this choice the firm will opt 
to forgo b.107 
To be sure, we don’t know whether these (or other) scenari-
os play out very often; and even if they do, perhaps the social 
cost of enjoining the use of b is large enough that, on balance, 
the cost of a few false positives (denying an injunction when it 
actually would be welfare-enhancing) outweighs the cost of the 
false negatives (granting injunctions when doing so would ac-
tually enable preemptive patenting) resulting from a rule that 
permits injunctive relief.108 All we can say with certainty, how-
ever, is that our unprotected market analysis provides some 
reason to question whether injunctions serve the public interest 
in cases in which a firm uses patent a and refuses to use or li-
cense patent b. It doesn’t prove the case one way or the other, 
though, and courts still need to exercise appropriate judgment 
based on the facts before them.  
 
 106. Recall from above that, in some circumstances, a firm may foresee 
higher profits through exclusive licensing. See supra note 36. 
 107. Of course, if others are likely to independently invent b anyway, the 
potential social welfare loss from reducing the patentee’s ex ante incentive to 
invent and patent b is somewhat reduced as well. Moreover, not inventing and 
patenting b leaves the firm vulnerable to someone else doing so instead, in 
which case the firm doesn’t even get the benefit of a reasonable royalty. On 
somewhat altered facts, however, if the firm had yet to disclose and market a 
when it developed b, it might be less motivated to disclose and market a ab-
sent the ability to foreclose competitors from using b, if it believed those com-
petitors would soon develop b on their own. Cf. Michael L. Katz, Intellectual 
Property Rights and Antitrust Policy: Four Principles for a Complex World, 1 
J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 325, 343 n.42 (2002) (“One might also argue 
that even purely preemptive patenting is beneficial if it increases the degree to 
which the original innovator can earn a return on the innovations of which it 
does make use. This line of argument, however, suggests that patent scope 
should be increased, not that firms should make real expenditures solely to 
protect rents and quasi-rents.”). 
 108. Conceivably, a court deciding whether to grant an injunction against a 
defendant’s use of b could inquire into the facts surrounding the patentee’s de-
cision to invent, or into whether the conditions the economists argue must be 
present for preemptive patenting to occur are in fact present. In crafting pa-
tent remedies, however, there is always a tradeoff between administrability 
and accuracy, and whether it would be worth making such detailed factual in-
quiries in the sort of case under consideration here strikes us as doubtful. 
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III.  DIAGONALLY INTEGRATED NON-PRACTICING 
ENTITIES   
The second key insight that flows from the analysis we 
presented in Part I is that diagonally integrated NPEs pose 
greater risks to short- and long-term social welfare than do 
conventional NPEs. Using a term coined by Richard Higgins, 
we consider a firm to be diagonally integrated if it produces a 
“downstream” product while also controlling an “upstream” in-
put that is used (or could be used) by downstream rivals, but 
which the firm does not use in its own downstream product.109 
For example, if an electricity provider acquired a major solar 
panel manufacturer but continued to offer only electricity gen-
erated by its power station, then it would become diagonally in-
tegrated with respect to the solar panel technology. Thus, the 
electricity provider does not actually sell the solar panels to 
consumers, but the acquisition is nevertheless profitable be-
cause it allows the provider to suppress competition with firms 
that install residential solar panels by raising their costs of ac-
quiring the solar panels, or potentially by refusing to sell them 
solar panels. This is an invaluable opportunity, as a firm will 
benefit substantially from an increase in its rival’s costs.110 
When diagonal integration involves acquiring the patent to 
an input technology used exclusively by downstream rivals, 
then the firm becomes a diagonally integrated NPE. By defini-
tion it is an NPE with respect to the acquired patent, because 
only its rivals practice that patent, but it is also diagonally in-
tegrated because it competes with those rivals in the down-
stream market. At first glance it may seem that diagonal inte-
gration is unlikely to be a widespread phenomenon, but in fact 
diagonally integrated NPEs are common, particularly in pa-
tent-rich technology markets. As noted above, large technology 
firms frequently acquire large patent portfolios without intend-
ing to practice all of the patents therein.111 These unpracticed 
patents nevertheless may improve the acquiring firm’s market 
position, as the firm may assert them against competitors 
whose products are covered by those patents. In this way, the 
patent system creates many opportunities for diagonal integra-
 
 109. See Higgins, supra note 24, at 610–12 (introducing the concept of “di-
agonal integration”). 
 110. Steven C. Salop & David T. Scheffman, Cost-Raising Strategies, 36 J. 
INDUS. ECON. 19, 20–21 (1987) (explaining why firms benefit by taking 
measures that increase rivals’ costs).  
 111. See supra note 54 and accompanying text. 
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tion. When achieved through patent acquisition, diagonal inte-
gration will also tend to be more difficult to circumvent. Indeed, 
if an input technology is patent protected, then it will tend to 
face less competition, and thus its users may be limited in their 
ability to switch to an alternative provider. This enables a di-
agonally integrated NPE to place more pressure on competitors 
whose products read on the acquired patents. 
Trebro became a diagonally integrated NPE when it ac-
quired the ‘638 patent but neglected to use that technology in 
its own products.112 In this light, the principal impact of Trebro 
was to declare that a court may award a plaintiff-manufacturer 
injunctive relief for the infringement of a patented technology 
with respect to which the firm is diagonally integrated.113 How-
ever, as we shall demonstrate, diagonal integration leads to the 
worst possible effects on competition and consumers with re-
spect to the unpracticed patent.114 The results are even more 
adverse than those that would arise if the unpracticed patent 
were held by a standard (unintegrated) NPE. It is therefore 
troublesome that the Trebro opinion completely neglected to 
explore the competition policy implications of its decision. 
Diagonal integration has the flavor of vertical integration, 
but in fact it produces very different results.115 A vertically in-
tegrated firm is one that sells both an upstream input and a 
downstream product that utilizes that input. For example, Ap-
ple is vertically integrated with respect to computer hardware 
and software, as it produces not only physical computers but 
also the OS X operating systems used therein. Microsoft has 
historically not been vertically integrated in this way, because 
until recently it focused almost exclusively on software, which 
it developed and sold to independent PC manufacturers. The 
prevailing economic attitude toward vertical integration, often 
dubbed the “Post-Chicago” approach, is that it typically produc-
es some procompetitive efficiencies while also creating some po-
tential for anticompetitive conduct.116 The principal procompet-
 
 112. See Trebro Mfg. v. FireFly Equip., L.L.C., 748 F.3d 1159, 1164 (Fed. 
Cir. 2014) (“[N]one of Trebro’s currently available sod harvesters practice the 
‘638 patent.”).  
 113. Id. at 1171 (holding that a plaintiff who does not practice a patent 
may be entitled to an injunction if it produces a competing product).  
 114. The appendix develops an economic model that formally proves this 
claim. 
 115. See appendix for a welfare comparison.  
 116. See Michael H. Riordan & Steven C. Salop, Evaluating Vertical Mer-
gers: A Post-Chicago Approach, 63 ANTITRUST L.J. 513, 519–20 (1995).  
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itive effects involve the elimination of double marginalization117 
and the improved compatibility and design of the integrated ar-
ticles.118 These efficiencies must be weighed against potential 
anticompetitive effects, which include the possibilities of fore-
closing rivals or increasing the price they must pay for up-
stream inputs.119 The prevailing attitude is that, on balance, 
most instances of vertical integration are welfare-enhancing.120 
The below figures illustrate the differences between possible 
downstream-upstream integration arrangements. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In these figures there are two upstream technologies, U1 
and U2, which are used in the downstream products D1 and 
D2, respectively. The “fenced in” area in each diagram desig-
nates the set of upstream and downstream products controlled 
by the integrated firm. The right hand diagram, which de-
scribes a vertically and diagonally integrated firm, is illustra-
tive of the circumstances in Trebro, and perhaps of most in-
stances in which diagonal integration is achieved through 
patent acquisition. This means that the integrated firm is a 
 
 117. Double marginalization, also known as royalty stacking or double 
markup, refers to a pricing situation in which two or more firms in a supply 
chain (including the final product seller) independently apply markups to their 
own contributions to the final product. For example, a wholesaler will apply a 
positive markup to its sales to a retailer, and the retailer will in turn apply its 
own markup to the product when selling it to consumers. All else being con-
stant, double marginalization is always surplus reducing for both firms and 
consumers. That is, if a vertically integrated firm applied a single markup to 
the final product, the net result would be a lower price and higher total profits, 
thus increasing both consumer and producer surplus. See id. at 526–27. 
 118. See id. 
 119. See id. at 527–29; see also Janusz A. Ordover et al., Equilibrium Verti-
cal Foreclosure, 80 AM. ECON. REV. 127, 140 (1990). 
 120. See Riordan & Salop, supra note 116, at 519 (“Because many vertical 
mergers create vertical integration efficiencies between purchasers and 
sellers, many if not most vertical mergers are either procompetitive or compet-
itively neutral.”). 
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practicing entity with respect to its own technologies (meaning 
it is vertically integrated with respect to them), and also diago-
nally integrated with respect to some later-acquired patented 
technology. 
The appendix develops a simple economic model of diago-
nal integration that is designed to fit the facts of Trebro. It 
measures the impact of a firm like Trebro becoming diagonally 
integrated, relative to the case in which the acquired patent is 
instead controlled by an unintegrated NPE. It establishes the 
general result that diagonal integration generates all the costs 
of vertical integration but none of the benefits. It leads the in-
tegrated firm to increase its rival’s costs or deny it access to the 
upstream input, but it does not produce any cost efficiencies or 
improved input-output compatibility. In fact, it actually makes 
the double marginalization problem worse by inducing a higher 
royalty rate for the upstream input. Thus a diagonally inte-
grated NPE would charge a higher royalty for the unpracticed 
patent than would an unintegrated NPE. The intuition for this 
is straightforward. A standard NPE has no direct stake in the 
downstream market, and thus cares only about the licensing 
revenue it receives. By contrast, a diagonally integrated NPE 
cares not only about licensing revenue, but also the value of 
raising its rival’s costs, which positively impacts its own down-
stream profits.121 This additional consideration leads the diag-
onally integrated NPE to set a higher royalty rate than the un-
integrated NPE. Patent ownership by a standard NPE is in 
turn worse than an arrangement in which the upstream patent 
is owned by the producer that utilizes it. In this case that pro-
ducer is a practicing entity, which is simply a patent holder 
that is vertically integrated in the downstream market. This 
would achieve the highest possible welfare level with respect to 
the patent in question by eliminating the separate upstream 
markup.122 
 
 121. See Ordover et al., supra note 119, at 127–28; see also Scott Morton & 
Shapiro, supra note 43, at 489–90 (“[T]he hybrid PAE has a greater incentive 
to raise the costs of target firms than does the pure PAE.”). 
 122. In this respect, then, it is fair to say that the competitive effects of di-
agonal integration differ from the effects that would flow merely from a prac-
ticing entity’s market dominance. The practicing entity may be able to charge 
a supracompetitive price for its patented product, but the law tolerates this 
result to induce the dynamic efficiency benefits on which the patent incentive 
is premised. A diagonally integrated NPE as we have defined it, however, im-
poses welfare losses by raising its rivals’ costs without achieving any of the 
procompetitive benefits of vertical integration.  
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To summarize our model’s results, when a firm like Trebro 
becomes a diagonally integrated NPE, the following changes 
arise123:  
• the royalty demanded for licensing to the down-
stream rival increases, potentially to a level at 
which it is compelled to exit the market (this is 
equivalent to enjoining the rival); 
• the prices of both downstream products increase, so 
that the double marginalization problem actually 
grows worse; 
• the integrated firm’s output increases, but by less 
than the downstream rival’s output falls, so that to-
tal output falls overall;  
• total welfare falls, as does consumer welfare. 
Importantly, the magnitudes of all of these effects are 
higher when the downstream products are closer substitutes 
(i.e., when downstream competition is more rigorous). At one 
extreme, if the products are perfect substitutes then the down-
stream rival is excluded from the market and welfare is at its 
lowest. Additionally, if we make the reasonable assumption 
that the downstream rival has some fixed costs to cover, then it 
will be excluded by the diagonally integrated NPE even when 
the products are close but imperfect substitutes. At the other 
extreme, if they are independent products then the above ef-
fects shrink to zero, and the diagonally integrated NPE acts 
exactly the same as an unintegrated NPE. This is not surpris-
ing, because when the downstream products are independent 
(meaning they do not compete), then the integrated firm does 
not benefit from raising the other firm’s cost, and is thus fo-
cused purely on licensing revenue, just like the unintegrated 
NPE. 
For these reasons, it is clear that diagonal integration pos-
es a serious threat to competition and welfare. The decision in 
Trebro thus establishes a dangerous precedent, potentially en-
abling diagonally integrated NPEs to fully leverage their struc-
tural advantage over downstream rivals. That is, by neglecting 
to limit the availability of injunctive relief for diagonally inte-
 
 123. These are the changes in equilibrium variables relative to the case in 
which the unpracticed patent is held by a standard unintegrated NPE. See the 
appendix for a diagram describing this shift. If the basis for comparison were 
instead the case in which the downstream rival owned the patent on its own 
input, then the same effects would arise, but the magnitude of each effect 
would be even greater. 
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grated NPEs claiming infringement of their unpracticed pa-
tents, the Trebro decision provides the ultimate leverage need-
ed to maximize the anticompetitive potential of diagonal inte-
gration. Given the acute economic hazards posed by this result, 
it is particularly concerning that the Federal Circuit neglected 
to even consider the competition policy implications of its deci-
sion. In our view, such considerations render the Federal Cir-
cuit’s position untenable. A better rule would be to limit most 
diagonally integrated NPEs to legal remedies, which would lim-
it their ability to charge exorbitant royalties, thereby blunting 
the anticompetitive potential of diagonal integration. And, as 
our earlier arguments demonstrate, such a rule would fre-
quently promote static welfare without materially undermining 
the incentive to innovate. 
  CONCLUSION   
The modern approach to assessing whether an injunction is 
warranted in a given case involves a myopic focus on the com-
parative hardships of the parties and the public at large, as 
measured at the time of infringement. This Article proposes a 
different approach: we argue that the courts could better ap-
praise the merits of injunctive relief by looking to the time of 
invention and asking whether the right to exclude was actually 
a necessary quid pro quo for the inventor’s decision to develop 
its innovative ideas. This approach aligns judicial decision 
making with the patent system’s objective of providing only 
those protections that are actually necessary to induce an inno-
vation’s development. In many cases it will be impossible to 
make this determination, but we demonstrate that there are a 
number of situations in which it can be inferred from the inven-
tor’s actions and the circumstances under which his product en-
tered the market. One such situation involves a plaintiff who is 
a diagonally integrated NPE (an NPE who competes with 
products reading on its unpracticed patent in a downstream 
market) with respect to the disputed patent, and which entered 
the downstream product market unprotected from competitors 
using the patented article. 
Our approach suggests that the Federal Circuit erred in 
Trebro by concluding that a plaintiff may be entitled to enjoin 
an infringer of its unpracticed patent if it competes with the 
disputed technology in a downstream market. This is true even 
if, like the plaintiff in Trebro, it entered the downstream mar-
ket unprotected from competing products using that technolo-
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gy. The approach also sheds some light on a number of im-
portant patent topics, including FRAND-encumbered patents, 
preemptive patenting, and patent privateering. We also provide 
detailed analysis of diagonally integrated NPEs—a business 
model that is becoming increasingly common in markets where 
patents are regularly bought and sold. Large firms in these in-
dustries will commonly acquire large portfolios encompassing 
many competing technologies that the acquiring firms do not 
intend to use in their own products. We demonstrate that diag-
onally integrated NPEs are more harmful to welfare than 
standard (unintegrated) NPEs. Such a firm’s welfare effects are 
similarly more adverse than those that would arise if it were a 
practicing entity with respect to the patented article. 
 
APPENDIX: A SIMPLE MODEL OF DIAGONALLY INTEGRATED NON-
PRACTICING ENTITIES 
 
 In this Section, we present a simple model of diagonally in-
tegrated non-practicing entities (NPEs) and their effects on 
competition and welfare. A diagonally integrated NPE is a firm 
who competes in a downstream market, and which holds a pa-
tent for an upstream input technology practiced by a down-
stream rival, but which it does not practice itself. To model 
this, we posit a two-tier vertical market structure with differ-
entiated products. There is an upstream market that contains 
two distinct technological inputs, U1 and U2, which are subject 
to patent protection. These input technologies are used by pro-
ducers in the downstream market, which contains two (differ-
entiated) competing products, D1 and D2. U1 is an essential 
input in D1 (but unused by D2), and so on for U2 and D2. The 
upstream firms do not sell physical things, but rather licenses 
to use their patented input technologies, and thus there are no 
production costs associated with upstream sales. The only cost 
of producing a downstream product is that of acquiring the 
right to use its essential input, which is sold on a per-unit basis 
via a running royalty set by the upstream patent holder. 
 There are two downstream firms, Firm 1 and Firm 2, 
which sell products D1 and D2, respectively. We assume 
throughout that Firm 1 holds the patent over U1, so that it is 
vertically integrated with respect to U1 (i.e., it is a practicing 
entity with respect to U1.) By contrast, Firm 2 does not hold 
the patent over U2, but rather must acquire the rights to use it 
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from a patent holder (we later consider the case in which Firm 
2 owns the patent on U2.) We compare two scenarios. In sce-
nario 1, the patent on U2 is owned by a standard unintegrated 
NPE. In scenario 2, Firm 1 becomes a diagonally integrated 
NPE by acquiring the patent for technology U2, while continu-
ing to produce only D1. These scenarios are depicted in the dia-
grams below.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
To model downstream competition, we posit a quadratic 
two-product utility function representing the preferences of a 
representative consumer. We assume that the downstream 
products are symmetrically differentiated imperfect substi-
tutes. This utility function is defined by  
 
u(q1,q2) = a(q1 + q2) – 1/2b(q12 + q22 +2sq1q2) 
 
where qi denotes the quantity of downstream good i, a and b 
are positive scalars, and s ∈  [0,1] denotes the degree of substi-
tutability between D1 and D2. The values s = 1 and s = 0 corre-
spond to the extreme cases of perfect substitutes and independ-
ent products, respectively. The representative consumer 
maximizes consumer surplus, given by u(q1,q2) – p1q1 – p2q2 
where pi denotes the price of downstream product i. The first 
order conditions for q1 and q2 yield the inverse demand func-
tions associated with D1 and D2, respectively. 
 
p1 = a – bq1 – sbq2, p2 = a – bq2 – sbq1 
 
 Firms 1 and 2 engage in Cournot competition with differ-
entiated products. Note that Firm 1’s production costs are zero, 
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since it owns the patent rights to U1 and thus will not charge 
itself a royalty. Firm 2 pays a constant marginal cost of 𝑟 per 
unit, which denotes the royalty rate charged by the patent 
holder of U2. Firm 1’s downstream profits are thus given by  
Π1 = q1(a – bq1 – sbq2), while Firm 2’s profits are given by  
Π2 = q2(a – bq2 – sbq1 – r). Taking the first order condition for 
each Πi with respect to qi and solving for qi yields firm i’s best 
response function. Assuming r is sufficiently low to ensure 
nonnegative output by Firm 2, the best responses of Firms 1 
and 2 are BR1(q2) = a/2b – sq2/2 and BR2(q1) = (a – r)/2b – sq1/2, 
respectively. These generate the following unique Nash-
Cournot equilibrium output levels 
  𝑞1 (𝑟, 𝑠) = (2− 𝑠)𝑎 + 𝑠𝑟𝑏(4− 𝑠!) ,           𝑞!(𝑟, 𝑠) = (2− 𝑠)𝑎 − 2𝑟𝑏(4− 𝑠!)  
 
 Using each firm’s profit-maximization first order condition, 
it is easy to verify that the corresponding equilibrium prices 
and profits are given by  
 
p1(r,s) = bq1(r,s), p2(r,s) = bq2(r,s) + r 
 
Π1(r,s) = bq1(r,s)2, Π2(r,s) = bq2(r,s)2 
 
 This fully characterizes the downstream equilibrium as a 
function of r. Unsurprisingly, a higher r benefits Firm 1 and in-
jures Firm 2. Firm 1’s output and profits are strictly increasing 
in r, while the opposite is true for Firm 2. Both prices are in-
creasing in r, with p2(r,s) > p1(r,s) for all r > 0. By contrast, both 
firms are strictly better off when the products are more differ-
entiated: output, price, and profits of each firm are strictly fall-
ing in s.1 
 In scenario 1, the patent on U2 is owned by an unintegrat-
ed NPE. This NPE’s objective is simply to maximize its total li-
censing receipts. Thus the NPE maximizes rq2(r,s). This yields 
a unique profit-maximizing royalty rate, r*(s), defined by  
 
 
 1. To see that outputs are decreasing in 𝑠, note that a higher 𝑠 makes 
each best response function decrease more rapidly, which causes the equilibri-
um output profile to shift inward toward the origin. 
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𝑟∗(𝑠) = (2− 𝑠)𝑎4  
 
 Given that this royalty is positive and that downstream 
competition is imperfectly competitive, there is a double mar-
ginalization problem in scenario 1. If instead Firm 2 owned the 
patent on U2 (meaning it is vertically integrated, just like Firm 
1) then the royalty rate would be zero and the downstream 
price would fall, leading to an unambiguous welfare improve-
ment. This is a well-established result of vertical integration, 
as noted in Section IV. In scenario 2, Firm 1 owns the patent on 
U2, making it a diagonally integrated NPE. Unlike the unin-
tegrated NPE, Firm 1 now cares not only about the revenue de-
rived from licensing to Firm 2, but also about raising its rival’s 
costs, which increases its own downstream profits. Thus Firm 1 
chooses r to maximize Π1(r,s) + rq2(r,s), leading to a unique 
equilibrium royalty rate of r**(s), defined by  
 𝑟∗∗(𝑠) = 8+ 4𝑠 − 2𝑠!8− 3𝑠! 𝑟∗(𝑠) 
 
 r**(s) exceeds r*(s) for all positive s. Thus diagonal integration 
leads to a higher royalty rate whenever the downstream prod-
ucts compete. Intuitively, Firm 1’s licensing demand is as low 
as the unintegrated NPE’s only when the products are inde-
pendent, in which case there is no independent value to in-
creasing its rival’s costs. The increase in the royalty rate, 
 r**(s) – r*(s), is strictly increasing and convex in s. Thus, the 
more rigorous the downstream competition, the higher the in-
crease in the royalty rate. In the extreme case of perfect substi-
tutes (s = 1), Firm 1 actually excludes Firm 2 from the market 
completely by setting a royalty at which Firm 2 optimally pro-
duces zero units. If we made the additional assumption that 
Firm 2 has some fixed costs to cover, then there would be some 
interval of substitutability levels (s0,1] within which Firm 2 
would not operate in scenario 2.2 
 That r increases upon diagonal integration implies the 
 
 2. In particular, this would be the interval of substitutability levels at 
which any royalty rate 𝑟 that Firm 2 could afford to pay would lead Firm 1’s 
downstream profits to fall by more than 𝑟𝑞!(𝑟, 𝑠). 
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prices of both downstream products increase as well. Thus, in 
contrast to standard vertical integration, diagonal integration 
actually makes the double marginalization problem worse. Like 
the royalty rate, the increase in the price of each downstream 
good grows larger as s increases. Additionally, Firm 1’s output 
expands, but by less than Firm 2’s output falls, creating a net 
reduction in total output. Finally, it is easy to verify that total 
welfare and consumer welfare both fall. Note that, for any out-
put profile (q1,q2), total welfare is given by u(q1,q2), because all 
costs faced by producers are simply transfers made to an up-
stream patent holder. Letting W(r,s) = u(q1(r,s),q2(r,s)) denote 
equilibrium total welfare, it is easy to verify that  
∂W/∂r = p1(∂q1/∂r) + p2(∂q2/∂r). Given that p2 > p1 and  
∂q2/∂r < –∂q1/∂r < 0 in equilibrium, it follows that ∂W/∂r < 0. 
Thus total welfare falls upon diagonal integration. Finally, note 
that consumer welfare must also fall, because both downstream 
prices increase.  
 
